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Torts 
by Frederick J. Moreau* 
New occasions teach new duties 
Time makes ancient good uncouth 
They must upwards still, and onward 
Who would keep abreast with truth. 
Lo, before us gleam her campfires 
We ourselves, must pilgrims be 
Launch our Mayflower and steer 
Boldly through the desperate wintry sea. 
James Russell Lowell-The Present Crisis 
Constantly, the bounds of duty are 
enlarged by knowledge of a prospective use. 
Cardozo, Glanzer v. Shepard, 
233 N.Y. 236,135 N.E. 275, 23 A.L.R. 1425 
(1922). 
"Ph.B. 1922, University of Wiscon-
sin, LL.B. 1925, University of Wiscon-
sin Law School. LL.M. 1937, Co-
lumbia University. J.D. 1966, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin. Professor of Law, 
University of California, Hastings Col-
lege of the Law. Member, Wisconsin 
and Kansas State Bars. 
The author extends his appreciation 
to Robert Edwards, student at Golden 
Gate College, School of Law, for as-
sistance in preparation of this article. 
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I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years 
upon the bench, to find how trackless was the 
ocean on which I had embarked. I sought cer-
tainty. I was oppressed and disheartened when 
I found that the quest for it was futile. * * * 
I have become reconciled to the uncertainty 
because I have grown to see it is not discovery, 
but creation; and the doubts and misgivings, 
the hopes and the fears, are part of the travail 
of mind, the pangs of death and the pangs of 
birth in which principles that have served 
their day expire, and new principles are born. 
Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, 
pp. 166-7. 
Negligence 
Duty 
The field of negligence is undoubtedly the one that domi-
nates litigation in these times in our complex economic struc-
ture. There is much interdependence of peoples which re-
sults from technology. For this reason we look at negligence 
at the outset. Basically, actionable negligence is simply a 
cause of action that consists of four elements: a duty or 
obligation recognized or imposed by law; a breach of that 
duty; a causal connection with resulting damage; and the 
damage itself. Many opinions on negligence begin with a 
statement to this effect,l and all texts on the subject follow 
the same routine. 2 And it must be true that all the complex 
problems that arise in connection with the subject must be 
related in some way to one or more of these four basic ele-
ments. 
1. White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 
273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941); Raymond v. 
Paradise Unified School District, 218 
Cal. App.2d 1,31 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1963); 
Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App.2d 
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136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968). For 
further discussion of this case, see Selig-
son, Insurance Law, in this volume. 
2. Prosser, Law of Torts, 3d. ed., p. 
146; Harper all Torts, section 66. 
2
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This year has brought forth very significant changes in 
our law, in effect modifying some formerly accepted attitudes 
toward some of these elements. The court gives guidelines to 
the jury with reference to breaches of duty, causal connection, 
and damage, elements which are normally for the jury to de-
cide under instructions. With reference to the existence of a 
duty,3 it is particularly for the court to determine because 
initially it must decide whether there is a case which must be 
submitted to the jury. If there is no existing duty, there can 
be no breach, no wrongful conduct, and therefore nothing 
further to decide. Yet there may be cases in which the court 
submits the duty questions to the jury; these are generally 
cases in which the facts are in dispute, in which event the 
jury resolves the facts and then applies the law according to 
the instructions of the court. The point is that the jury 
chooses from among conflicting facts in arriving at the exist-
ence or non-existence of a duty, but the court still has great 
influence because it advises the jury as to what findings of 
fact will give rise to a duty to exercise care. 
The court often decides to whom a duty is owing as well 
as whether that duty exists. This is what was done in Palsgraf 
v. Long Island R.R. CO.,4 in which Justice Cardozo held that 
while conduct might have been tortious toward someone other 
than the plaintiff, it would not be tortious toward an unfore-
seeable plaintiff; that is, a person beyond the range of fore-
seeability, even if such person were injured directly by conduct 
careless with reference to others. As he expressed it, "The 
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed". 
With limitations to be noted later, the foreseeability of risk re-
maInS the basic consideration in finding the existence of a 
duty. 
3. See Matthias v. United Pacific In- by the alleged wrongdoer to the person 
surance Co., 260 Cal. App. 2d 752 at injured, or to a class of which he is a 
753, 67 Cal. Rptr. 511 at 512 (1968) member." 
stating that: "An indispensable factor 4. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 59 
to liability founded upon negligence is A.L.R. 1253 (1928). 
the existence of a duty of care owed 
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With this preliminary foundation in mind, we proceed to 
examine the facts in Dillon v. Legg,5 decided in June, 1968. 
The complaint alleged that defendant Legg was negligently 
driving his automobile along a road in Sacramento County at 
the time that plaintiff's young daughter was lawfully crossing 
the road in front of him, and that Legg's automobile struck 
the child and caused injuries resulting in her death. The 
first cause of action was for the wrongful death of the child, 
which is routine. As a second cause of action, however, 
the plaintiff alleged that she, the mother of the child, was in 
proximity to the collision and witnessed the collision and 
the injury to her child, which caused her great emotional dis-
turbance, shock, injury to her nervous system, and great 
physical and mental pain and suffering. After filing an 
answer, the defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, 
contending that no cause of action was stated, as the plaintiff 
alleged only that she suffered emotional distress, shock, and 
fright induced by apprehension of negligently caused danger or 
injury to a third person. Defendant further contended that 
the plaintiff may not recover, even when the third person is 
a close relative, so long as the apprehension is not for plain-
tiff's own danger. Defendant, of course, made this motion 
relying on Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co. 6 Ac-
cordingly, a study or review of Amaya is essential to an under-
standing of this case, though we can note at once that in 
Dillon the supreme court reversed the trial court's ruling 
granting defendant's motion. The majority opinion in Dillon 
thinks in terms of distinguishing Amaya, but Traynor's dissent 
to Dillon rests on the theory that Amaya is controlling; so 
it must be his opinion that they are not distinguishable, both 
involving emotional disturbance and shock for viewing a 
third person about to be maimed or killed, and that it matters 
not that the third person is a child, sister, or spouse of the 
person put in apprehension. Yet both cases involved a close 
relative. 
5. 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 6. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 
441 P.2d 912 (1968). 379 P.2d 513 (1963); Torts Restatement, 
§313(2). 
376 CAL LAW 1969 
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A brief examination of the Amaya decision will help us in 
our study of Dillon. It was a mother's suit for physical in-
juries resulting from emotional shock caused by fear for the 
safety of her minor child, who was hit by defendant's truck 
while it was being negligently operated. The opinion of the 
district court of appeal, by Justice Tobriner, then on that 
bench, went right to the duty problem and held that an auto-
mobile operator, as a reasonable man, should foresee that 
the class of persons who may suffer harm from his mis-
conduct includes a parent whose emotional distress may come 
from the exposure of his child to injury, adding that "we cannot 
hold as a matter of law that the risk of such injury is not 
foreseeable in the context of present day conditions". He cites 
Prosser, who indicates that most people "feel" that such a 
parent should recover. He then traces historically the feudal 
rules wherein there was almost absolute liability,7 until the 
Industrial Revolution caused a breaking away from such 
strictness and caused the movement to fault as the basis 
required for a breach of duty.8 And duty simply means those 
considerations which lead society to conclude that the plain-
tiff's interests are entitled to protection. 
Justice Tobriner points out that the problem of finding a 
duty is more difficult when the plaintiff is said to be unfore-
seeable and when the injury consists of emotional distress. He 
reminds us of the famous case, Donoghue v. Stevenson,9 in 
which Lord Atkin raised the nice question: "Who is my 
neighbor?" That is, who is the person to whom a duty is 
owed? The answer being-those persons who are so closely 
affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in 
contemplation when my acts affecting them are called in ques-
tion. Obviously, Justice Tobriner felt that the mother was so 
closely and directly affected by the defendant's act that the 
defendant should be held to have had her in contemplation. 
The in jury to the plaintiff is foreseeable if the defendant's con-
7. Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 134, 80 9. AC. 562 (1932). See Marsh's 
Eng. Rep. 284 (1616). comment on this in 69 L.Q.R. at 182. 
8. Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush (60 
Mass) 292 (1850). 
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duct encompasses potential risk to a class of persons which 
includes the plaintiff. The court lists the grounds usually 
relied on for denying recovery: (a) the absence of impact; 
(b) the absence of the presence of the plaintiff in the zone of 
impact; (c) the absence of physical manifestations of emotion-
al distress; (d) the absence of plaintiff's fear for his own 
safety; and final1y (e) the danger of fraudulent claims. The 
justice then explains themal1 away and returns to the basic 
issue of foreseeability of risk-the key question-and refers 
to the objections above as "court-inspired theories to restrict 
the range of liability of a defendant to narrow areas". Yet 
he recognizes that a boundary line shoud be drawn. Prosser 
is relied on for the suggestion that in order to avoid ridiculous 
cases we should require that: (a) the threatened injury must 
be serious enough to cause severe shock; (b) the shock must 
result in actual physical injury or harm; (c) the person 
threatened should be related in some way to the plaintiff, and 
(d) the shock must be fairly contemporaneous with the de-
fendant's conduct. 
When Amaya was appealed to the supreme court and re-
versed by a vote of 4 to 3, the whole problem was again re-
viewed. Justice Schauer wrote for the majority. The problem 
was again restated clearly. "May tort liability be predicated 
on fright or nervous shock (with consequent bodily illness) 
induced solely by the plaintiff's apprehension of negligently 
caused danger or injury to a third person?" He concedes that 
California has not yet required concurrent impact on the 
plaintiff to enable him to recover, but finds that the question 
raised here has been before the court three times and in each 
case the court refused to resolve it. 
Schauer, in reversing, relied on the fact that 18 jurisdictions 
that had considered the matter held that the plaintiff had no 
cause of action; that the First Restatement, section 313, in 
dealing with the question, placed the issue in the form of a 
caveat, thus inviting action by the courts to resolve the matter. 
This was done in 1934. No court having taken the bait 
during the 29-year interim, the Reporter and his advisers, 
when drafting the Second Restatement in 1960, withdrew the 
378 CAL LAW 1969 
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caveat and restated the rule in accord with what was the 
unanimous trend of the decisions. Justice Schauer empha-
sized that the problem must be approached from the stand-
point of duty rather than from causation; that the mother must 
show a duty to herself not to be subjected to an unreasonable 
risk of fright or shock from seeing a third person (in this 
case, her daughter) in peril due to defendant's negligence. 
And even if it might be said that such fright might be fore-
seeable, that alone would not be sufficient to establish such a 
duty as a matter of law. There are other considerations in-
volved, such as administrative factors and the threat of fraudu-
lent claims. Intentional infliction of fright is one thing, but 
the mere negligent infliction of such fright is another matter. 
There is the fear that "extravagant credulity leads to in-
justice", assuming that in all these cases the fear is extrava-
gant. Then there is the socio-economic factor. This is the 
fear that such a liability would prove too far-reaching. In 
fact, the court here fastened on a statement or generalization 
to the effect that such a liability would be "unthinkable"; it 
would be beyond social utility. So the policy should be to re-
fuse to create such duties. It confirms the thinking of Justice 
Wickhem in Waube v. Warrington/o that such a liability 
"would be wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the 
negligent tortfeasor". 
The thorough dissent to A maya by Justice Peters, con-
curred in by Justices Gibson and Peek, is well worth careful 
study. He recognizes the unanimity of the decisions, but 
feels that this should not preclude critical analysis. The 
dissent is exhaustive; it disposes of all the usual arguments 
made: the requirement of impact; the presence of the plain-
tiff in the zone of impact; that though physical injury which 
follows mental disturbance cannot be the basis of recovery 
in some states, it is a]]owed in California; and that the rule 
that the plaintiff must fear for his own safety is not followed 
absolutely. Justice Peters concludes that in the light of 
modern times, a defendant who negligently endangers a child 
10. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497, 
98 A.L.R. 394 (1935). 
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should foresee that the child's mother may be nearby, and 
seeing her child endangered, will suffer shock with resulting 
physical consequences. But he would limit recovery to cases 
where the endangered person is a close relative, the shock is 
severe, actual harm results, the plaintiff is present at the 
time, and where the shock is contemporaneous with the en-
dangering. 
In Dillon v. Legg, we must note at once that the majority 
opinion is written by Justice Tobriner, who wrote the opinion 
in Amaya rendered by the district court of appeal. Again he 
takes up all the objections to recovery, and disposes of them 
in about the same manner in which he did in Amaya. He seeks 
to distinguish A maya in that it involves only a "third person," 
while here in Dillon we have the close relationship of m9ther 
and child and fear for the child. But to the extent that 
Amaya is contra to this decision, he overrules it. The impact 
rule has been rejected in California, and that automatically re-
jects the zone of danger rule because it was used only to in-
sure impact, and if impact is not essential neither is the sub-
stitute for it. He attacks the limited concept of duty as favor-
ing the property owner, and as a device designed to curtail the 
danger of large awards. l1 It was a way of limiting "un-
tempered fairness". It was also feared that the courts would 
be flooded with trumped-up claims, fraudulent and indefinable. 
But in such a case as this, the mother seeing her child en-
dangered will suffer real shock and physical injury there-
from-this will be no unreal situation. 
The mere possibility that fraudulent claims may be made is 
no reason for denying the entire class of such claims. Many 
cases in California reveal that the mere danger of fraud is no 
ground for denying recovery in all cases. Interspousal re-
coveries support this thinking. And the fear for one's own 
11. Toomey v. London and Brighton 
Rly., 3 C.B. (ns) 146. Marsh explains 
how the court reacted in this case in 
which a poor illiterate passenger fell 
down a stairway in the defendant's sta-
tion. The court held there was no 
evidence of negligence to go to the 
380 CAL LAW 1969 
jury, saying, "Every person who has 
any experience in courts of justice 
knows very well that a case of this sort 
against a railway company could only 
be submitted to a jury with one result." 
See Marsh, Invitees, Licensees and Tres-
passers, 69 L.Q.Rev. at 185. 
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safety is sufficient basis for recovery without impact.12 Proper 
guidelines can be set up to prevent any undue extension of 
liability. Basically, foreseeability of risk is the primary con-
sideration for allowing recovery; this is the foundation for 
establishing the element of duty in the absence "of overriding 
policy considerations".13 Defendant owes a duty only with 
respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the 
conduct unreasonably dangerous and therefore negligent.14 
The guidelines set out above will prevent the rash of cases 
feared by old decisions, the majority opinion in Amaya, 
and the dissents in Dillon. These safeguards bear repeating, 
and include: (a) the third person must be a close relative; 
(b) the shock must be a serious one; (c) the physical injury 
must be substantial; (d) it must occur immediately after the 
fright or shock is experienced; and (e) the plaintiff must 
have witnessed the negligent conduct toward the relative. 
These requirements will prevent any fraudulent claims. 
The reader should note what section 436 of the Restate-
ment provides. While Restatement section 313 considers the 
problem from a standpoint of duty, section 436 deals with 
liability for physical harms resulting from emotional dis-
turbance, in terms of proximate, or legal, cause. Subsection 1 
states that negligent conduct in failing to act with care to 
avoid causing fright or emotional disturbance which the actor 
would recognize as likely to bring about bodily harm will 
leave the actor liable even if the harm results solely from 
the created fright or emotional disturbance. Subsection 2 
provides that if the conduct was likely to create bodily harm 
otherwise than by subjecting a person to fright or shock, but 
the harm still results solely from the fright, the actor remains 
liable. Subsection 2 makes finding liability easier, of course, 
because the actor could foresee actual harm directly caused; 
12. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. 
Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 
(1952). 
13. Grafton v. Mollica, 231 Cal. 
App.2d 860, 42 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1965): 
McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 
Cal.2d 295, 195 P.2d 783 (1948); 
Hergenrether v. East, 6 [ Cal.2d 440, 
39 Cal. Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d 164 (1964). 
14. Keeton, L1'Ra/ ClIlIse ill the LlIll' 
of Torts, pp. 18-20; Seavy, Mr. Cllrdo~.(} 
lIl/(i the Law of Torts, 52 Harv.L.Rev. 
372 (1939). 
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so he is liable even though the harm came through fright or 
shock instead of through physical contact. Formerly, dam-
ages for fright, shock, pain and suffering, mental as well as 
physical, could be tacked onto other damages which resulted 
from other torts such as assault, battery, and false imprison-
ment. Under subsection 2, the damages for bodily harm 
caused by fright and shock need not be tacked onto something 
else. Subsection 3, however, finds the causal connection to 
be effected if the harm to plaintiff referred to in subsection 2 
results instead from fright or shock caused by the sight of 
harm or peril to a member of plaintiff's immediate family. 
Thus the very thing that Waube and Amaya held was not 
actionable, because there was no duty to guard against such 
dangers, is here held to be a causal result. Hence it was im-
portant to have Dillon establish a duty in such cases so as to 
make section 436 (3) fully operative in California. With the 
existence of the duty, its breach, and the causal connection, 
a perfect cause of action is established. 
Another great case making it easier to find a duty owing 
to a plaintiff is Rowland v. Christian. 15 It presents the prob-
lem of finding a new basis for determining the duty owing by 
occupiers and owners of realty toward persons on the premises. 
For years, we teachers of torts simply taught that there was 
one principal question involved in such cases: what was the 
status of the person on the premises? He could be one of 
three, namely: business invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Once 
that was settled, the duty followed as a matter of course. A 
business invitee was entitled to ordinary care; a trespasser 
was owed no duty, save to not be intentionally injured; and 
the licensee fared little better than the trespasser. He took 
the premises as he found them, even though he was expected; 
he was entitled to be warned about traps which the owner 
knew were concealed on the premises. 
Obviously, these rules evolved from the rights of land· 
owners to the exclusive possession of their properties; this 
was feudalism. As one moves around the Middle East and 
15. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, cussion of this case, see LAZEROW, REAL 
443 P.2d 561 (1968). For further dis- PROPERTY, in this volume. 
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other undeveloped regions and notes how private properties 
are surrounded by high walls, he sees how the right to ex· 
elusive possession was and still is a very essential right. This 
is a phase of tort law that was limited by property rights rather 
than by any thought of due care under the circumstances. The 
late Professor Bohlen was one of the first tort teachers to re· 
fer to this formula as having "a benumbing influence" on 
thinking about the legal relationships between owners or 
occupiers and persons on the premises.16 (These benumbing 
influences are always around.) 
The facts in Rowland were as follows: defendant offered to 
drive the plaintiff to the airport where plaintiff was to board 
a plane. Defendant invited plaintiff to her apartment before 
they were to leave for the airport. While there, plaintiff re-
quested to use the bathroom and was injured when the 
porcelain handle of a faucet broke in his hand. What was 
the duty owing by defendant toward the plaintiff under these 
circumstances? This is the issue. 
On the basis that the plaintiff was "purely and simply a 
social guest," but there was no business purpose involved, 
and that plaintiff was not paying anything to be driven to the 
airport, defendant moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff 
was a mere licensee under the common-law classification 
of persons on other peoples' premises. In the absence of 
traps or active negligence a licensee takes the premises as he 
finds them. No liability attaches for mere defective premises. 
The trial court granted the defendant's motion and the dis· 
trict court affirmed on the theory that there was no trap; there 
was nothing concealed. Yet it was true that the defendant 
knew of the condition of the faucet and did not warn the 
plaintiff. Under the Restatement Second, section 342/7, 18 
16. Bohlen, Duties of Landowners, 
69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 142, 237, 340. Re-
printed in Bohlen's Studies ill the Law 
of Torts at p. 160. This was written 
in 1921, and it was hailed as a stimulat-
ing comment by Marsh. See Marsh, 
69 L.Q. Rev 182 (1953). 
17,18. § 342 of Restatement 2d pro-
vides: "A possessor of land is subject 
to liability for physical harm caused to 
licensees by a condition on the land if, 
but only if, 
(a) the possessor knows or has reason 
to know of the condition and should 
realize that it involves an unreasonable 
risk of harm to such licensees, and 
should expect that they will not discover 
or realize the danger, and 
CAL LAW 1969 383 
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there is a provision for a warning of known dangerous con-
ditions. But the California courts had held that section 342 
was not the California rule. 19 
Another case not mentioned in the Rowland opinion that 
covers the whole question is Ross v. DeMond, 20 which stated 
that "it has been unequivocably stated that section 342 is not 
the law of this state". The court there recognized that the 
California rule, the old common law rule, has been severely 
criticized by writers as well as by a California court in Fer-
nandez v. Consolidated Fisheries Co.1 The writer has raised 
his own voice as to the soundness of this criticism.2 The 
court in Ross states that since Oettinger v. Stewart,S Cali-
fornia recognizes that there is a duty to avoid active negligence 
toward a licensee and even toward a discovered trespasser, as 
distinguished from the passive negligence involved in cases 
of defective conditions. Here one finds an effort to apply 
section 1714 of the Civil Code,4 as was done in Fernandez, 
but the court concluded that the law of California was still 
"a Procrustean bed bounded by the concepts of 'invitee' at the 
head and 'licensee' at the foot". 5 
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable 
care to make the condition safe, or to 
warn the licensees of the condition and 
the risk involved, and 
(c) the licensees do not know or have 
reason to know of the condition and the 
risk involved." 
19. Hansen v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 
2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965); Saba 
v. Jacobs, 130 Cal. App.2d 717, 279 
P.2d 826 (1955); Fisher v. General 
Petroleum Corp., 123 Cal. App.2d 770, 
267 P.2d 841 (1954). See also Ross v. 
DeMond, 48 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1966), in 
which a hearing was granted but there 
was no supreme court ruling on the 
case. 
20. Ross v. DeMond, 48 Cal. Rptr. 
at 749, in which a hearing was granted 
but there was no supreme court ruling 
on the case. 
1. 98 Cal. App.2d 91, 219 P.2d 73 
(1950). 
384 CAL LAW 1969 
2. Moreau, Stone, Legal System and 
Lawyers' Reasonings (Book Review), 
17 Hastings LJ. 854 (1966). 
3. 24 Cal.2d 133, 148 P.2d 19, 156 
A.L.R. 1221 (1944). 
4. Cal. Civil Code § 1714 states: 
"Everyone is responsible, not only for 
the result of his willful acts, but also 
for an injury occasioned to another by 
his want of ordinary care or skill in 
the management of his property or per-
son, except so far as the latter has, 
willfuJIy or by want of ordinary care, 
brought the injury upon himself." 
5. As to Procrustean beds in the com-
mon law, see Pound, An Introduction to 
the Philosophy of Law, Chapter V, p. 
145. "A systematist who would fit 
the living body of the law to his logical 
analytical scheme must proceed after 
the manner of Procrustes." Of course 
he then justifies dividing lines in order 
12
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This was the status of the law when the Rowland appeal 
came to the supreme court. The question had been con-
sidered just as thoroughly as the question in Amaya and 
Dillon. The motion for summary judgment had been granted 
and the district court of appeal affirmed, finding no basis 
for relief for this plaintiff. There was no trap, no con-
cealed trap, no active negligence, and still no duty to warn 
under section 342 of the new Restatement. 
The supreme court reversed by a vote of 5 to 2. The hold-
ing was that the summary judgment was not proper under what 
the facts might reveal. The facts might show that the defect 
was not obvious, and was probably concealed. The facts 
might also show that defendant was aware of the defect and 
did not warn, thereby violating a duty toward the plaintiff in 
neither warning of the danger, nor in eliminating it. Section 
1714 of the Civil Code is resurrected again and used as it 
was in Fernandez to set forth a civil-law principle which has 
been embedded and ignored in California law since 1872. 
The broad principle of duty from Heaven v. Pender6 is also 
used. The court criticizes the basis of liability emanating from 
considerations of land ownership and the need for protecting 
landowners. It is a heritage from feudalism. The Supreme 
Court of the United States has pointed out, too, that these 
rules were rooted in the land cultures that followed the 
feudal system.7 Marsh, the English writer, showed how Eng-
land had much difficulty in in getting away from the Pro-
crustean bed. Justice Peters lists at least ten exceptions which 
were made to the traditional categories. Among the excep-
tions he lists are: (a) foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, 
Cb) the degree of certainty that injury would follow, (c) 
closeness of conduct and injury, Cd) moral blame in defend-
ant's conduct, (e) policy of preventing future harm, (f) con-
to make our experiences more intelli-
gible. 
6. 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883). This case 
contains about the broadest principle 
from which to spell out a duty to act. 
7. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 
257, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 80 S.Ct. 725, 78 
25 
A.L.R.2d 233 (1960); Harper and 
James, The Law of Torts, p. 1430; 
Prosser, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 573; Marsh, 
The History and Comparative Law of 
Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 
L.Q.Rev. 182 and 359. 
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sequences upon the community, (g) availability of insurance, 
(h) whether there was active negligence as distinguished from 
passive conduct. He refers to Newman v. Fox West Coast 
Theaters,S a licensee case in which the court exacted a duty 
to warn. 
The court relies heavily on section 1714 of the Civil Code 
and Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries Co.9 to find liability 
generally. And the common-law classifications do not con-
stitute exceptions to the general rule. The court said, "We 
decline to follow and perpetuate such rigid classifications". 
The proper test is section 1714, Civil Code.1o Although the 
classes may be mentioned, they are no longer controlling. The 
big question is whether the defendant has acted as a reason-
able man in view of the probable injuries to others. It is 
strange indeed that our court has now discovered section 1714, 
which has been in the books since 1872. In a sense we might 
speak of the passing of an old common-law landmark. 
The California court seems to be the first to take this realistic 
step. The case has been sent back for a new trial, and, in 
fact, is being retried as this is being written. It will be interest-
ing to note how the trial court will draw its instruction to the 
jury in conformity with the opinion. Emphasis no doubt 
will be placed on whether the defect in the handle was ob-
vious or not; if it was not, there was a duty to warn the plaintiff. 
Perhaps possessors will have a duty to place guests and 
licensees in the same position as they themselves are. If they 
know of defects not obvious, a warning is due. The categories 
will still be mentioned for what they are worth. 
In Brochett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co.n the defendant held 
a prolonged Christmas party on December 23, 1966. One 
Huff, 19 years of age, an employee of the defendant, was a 
guest at the party; he was served copious drinks of liquor and 
urged to indulge the beverage so that he became grossly in-
8. 86 Cal. App.2d 428, 194 P.2d 706 10. See Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 
(1948). 2d l33, 148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221 
9. 98 Cal. App.2d 91, 219 P.2d 73 (1944). 
(1950). 11. 264 Cal. App.2d 69, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 136 (1968). 
386 CAL LAW 1969 
14
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 15
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/15
Torts 
toxicated and unable to drive. The defendant employer, 
knowing Huff's condition, placed him in the Thunderbird 
automobile which Huff was driving and directed him to go 
ahead and drive into traffic. The plaintiffs were stopped at 
a traffic light when Huff's car crashed into the rear end of 
their car and caused serious injuries to plaintiffs. The trial 
court sustained demurrers to plaintiffs' complaint on the basis 
of decisions in California12 holding that the mere sale or sup-
plying of intoxicating beverages to a person who becomes in-
toxicated thereby does not make the supplier liable in tort to a 
third person who is injured by the intoxicated person. The 
rationale is that the consumption of the liquor rather than 
its sale is the proximate cause of the injury. This thinking 
was extended to a sale of gasoline to an intoxicated per,son 
in Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc.,13 but the district court 
there indicated that it would have found liability if it did 
not feel that the liquor cases decided by the supreme court 
were imperative directives. But it indicated that the sale 
of the gasoline could very well be a proximate cause of the 
injuries. And if the use of the gasoline were foreseeable as 
likely to intervene, the original sale of liquor would remain a 
proximate cause because the intervening force (the sale of gas-
oline) would not also be a superseding cause, shifting the lia-
bility to the user solely. Section 447 of the Restatement 
support this theory. The district court felt bound by Cole v. 
Rush and Fleckner v. Dionne. l4 Once we note that the Fuller 
case was finally decided on the theory of proximate cause, 
however, we must assume that there was a breach of 
duty since the question of causation cannot be reached with-
out a prior finding of a breach of duty. On this issue, see 
Ewart v. Southern California Gas CO.15 
So the Brochett court went ahead and found a real basis 
for the existence of a duty on the part of the company putting 
12. Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 
2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Cole v. 
Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450, 
54 A.L.R.2d 1137 (1955). 
13. 250 Cal. App.2d 687, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 792 (1967). 
14. Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 
2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Cole v. 
Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450, 54 
A.L.R.2d 1137 (1955). 
15. 237 Cal. App.2d 163, 46 Cal. 
Rptr. 631 (1965). 
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on the Christmas party. It found that the special facts here 
rendered the liquor and gasoline cases inapplicable and not 
controlling. The distinction has its genesis in the special 
relationship existing between defendant company and Huff, 
its employee. Essentially, the basis of the cause of action 
is the undertaking to control the conduct of another, and he 
who undertakes to do an act must do so with care. It con-
stitutes a misfeasance rather than a mere nonfeasance. Several 
of the cases cited by the court hardly hit the proposition in-
volved, in that here there was neither a breach of a promise 
nor a misrepresentation. The relationship between these parties 
was such that defendant had assumed the responsibility for 
the well-being and conduct of the minor, not only for the 
protection of the minor, but also for members of the pUblic. 
The minor was grossly incompetent to drive, and the incom-
petence was caused by the defendant. Furthermore, the most 
persuasive fact is that the defendant guided the minor to his 
automobile. It is the strong policy of the state that intoxi-
cated persons must not drive. So Huff committed a crime, 
and the defendant aided and abetted him therein. Moreover, 
California has always held that a person who turns over the 
driving of an automobile to an intoxicated person is liable for 
the consequences.16 The same is true if one turns over his 
car to an incompetent. 17 
The ratio decidendi of the case is that "persons having a 
special relationship with a drunken minor employee, volun-
tarily inducing the improper operation of an automobile not 
owned by them, are liable for proximate consequences of such 
operation". In the other cases cited above, cars were owned 
by the defendant, but here the defendant, although he did not 
own the car, had control over its use because of other factors. 
Thus the basic fact here is the assumption of control under such 
circumstances as the facts indicate. It is interesting to con-
16. Caccamo v. Swanston, 94 Cal. 
App.2d 957, 212 P.2d 246 (1949); 
Schomaker v. Pravoo, 96 Cal. App.2d 
738, 216 P.2d 562 (1950). 
17. Buelke v. Levenstadt, 190 Cal. 
684, 214 P.42 (I923); Rocca v. Stein-
388 CAL LAW 1969 
metz, 61 Cal. App. 102, 214 P. 257 
(1923); McCalla v. Grasse, 42 Cal. App. 
2d 546, 109 P.2d 358 (1941); Owens v. 
Carmichael V-Drive Autos Inc., 116 
Cal. App. 348, 2 P.2d 580 (1931). 
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sider whether it would make a difference if Huff were 21 years 
old. Suppose he had been just a neighbor dropping in and 
imbibing too much? 
In Matthias v. United Pacific Insurance Co. IS we have an-
other duty problem indicating that human relationships can 
be surprisingly subtle. Premises, which were rented, were in 
a defective condition in that the front stairway risers were 
not uniform; nor was there a center railing facilitating the 
stairway's use. The owner insured himself with the defendant 
company against liability for risks which inhered in his re-
lationships with his tenants, his tenant's guests, and the public. 
It was obviously a liability policy by which the insurer obli-
gated itself to indemnify the owner, its insured, to the extent 
of satisfying such judgments as might be recovered against the 
owner. This suit aims to go right against the insurer on the 
theory that the company itself owed a duty to the injured 
person by having written the policy, knowing of the defects, 
thereby perhaps making the owner more careless since he 
could rely on the fact that he was insured. It calls to mind 
that on occasion when one cautions a driver about his driving 
he may facetiously or otherwise reply, "I am insured". This 
may indicate that the plaintiff's theory is not entirely ground-
less. 
No judgment had been rendered against the insured, and 
so the question is whether there is a direct liability upon the 
part of the insurer. Did it owe a duty to the plaintiff? The 
court observed that the indispensable factor in all negligence 
actions "is the existence of a duty of care owed by the alleged 
wrongdoer to the person injured, or to a class of which he is 
a member" .19 But the phrases "duty of care" and "unreason-
able risk of harm" do not provide a test of universal applica-
tion. The quest for such a formula out of the many decisions 
on the subject has been in vain. All scholars in the field 
18. 260 Cal. App.2d 752, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 511 (1968). 
19. 260 Cal. App.2d at 753, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. at 512. See also Routh v. Quinn, 
20 Cal.2d 488 at 491, 127 P.2d 1 at 3, 
149 A.L.R. 215 at 218 (1942), and 
Raymond v. Paradise Unified School 
District, 218 Cal. App.2d 1, 6, 31 Cal. 
Rptr. 847, 850 (1963). 
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agree on this.20 Generally, we can say the standard is one of 
reasonable conduct. See Restatement, sections 282 et seq. 
Guard against unreasonable risk of harm is the admonition. 
What tests have been suggested? The court reviews factors 
in Amaya, among them the social utility of the activity out 
of which the injury arises, balanced against the risks and costs 
involved. (See Restatement, section 292, which mentions 
the social value of the interest to be advanced by the conduct, 
and the extent of the chance that these interests will be ad-
vanced by the conduct.) Here the activity is the writing of 
an insurance contract by which the assured is given the bene-
fits of being reimbursed for what he might have to pay to 
people injured on his premises. Insurance spreads losses, and 
legislation recognizes the value of this activity. This attitude 
minimizes any thought that the contracts will encourage the 
creation and continuance of defective premises. Hence, allow-
ing such recovery as is sought here would defeat the basic 
purpose of insurance. It would make insurance more ex-
pensive and less attractive to the assured. It would result in 
the writing of policies only when there is practically no possi-
bility of loss through negligence. And even if foreseeability 
of harm were the criterion, the insurer here had no reason to 
foresee that the writing of the policy would encourage care-
lessness on the part of the assured. If it were so considered, 
it would get us into the problem of whether the negligence 
of the assured would then become a superseding force. If 
foreseeable, it would not be superseding, leaving both insured 
and insurer liable for the whole damage. But while the in-
surance company may have been negligent toward itself in 
insuring a poor risk, this does not spell out a duty toward the 
plaintiff. 
As to the claim that the insurance company did not take 
any action to advise or direct the owner to remedy the de-
20. Prosser, Law of Torls, 3d ed, p. 
334. "Various factors undoubtedly 
have been given conscious or uncon-
scious weight, including convenience of 
administration, capacity of the parties 
to bear the loss, a policy of preventing 
390 CAL LAW 1969 
future injuries, the moral blame at-
tached to the wrongdoer, and many 
others." See also Leon Green, The 
Dilly Problem ill Ne[?li[?ence Cases, 28 
Col.L.Rev. 1014 and 29 Col.L.Rev. 255. 
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fects, the court found that generally, in the absence of any 
special relationships, such as in Brochett v. Kitchen Boyd 
Motor Co./ there is no duty to take action to protect others.2 
Section 316 of the Restatement states that there may be a duty 
on the part of a parent to control a child, and section 317, a 
duty on a master to control a servant. Sections 318, 319, and 
320, respectively, refer to the duty of a possessor to control 
his licensee, duties of persons in charge of dangerous persons to 
control them, and the duty to guard a person under one's 
control to protect him against injuries from third persons. 
But there is no mention of any duty on the part of an insurer 
to control the assured. The absence of duty being clear, it is 
a matter of law for the court and not for the trier of fact. 
Historically there has been opposition to the recognition 
of new duties for the protection of valued interests such as 
the right to privacy,3 the right to maintain tort actions for 
negligence by persons without privity of contract,4 the right 
not to be subjected to intentionally inflicted mental disturb-
1. 264 Cal. App.2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
136 (1968). 
2. The case of Connor v. Great West-
ern Savings & Loan Asso., 69 Cal.2d 
-, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609, 
decided December 12, 1968, is so 
definitely within our thinking here that 
it is felt that it should be mentioned 
even if it extends us beyond our given 
year. Purchasers of a home in a resi-
dential development in Ventura County 
suffered damage when the homes suf-
fered serious damages from cracking 
caused by ill-designed foundations that 
could not withstand the expansion and 
contraction of adobe soil. The Valley 
Development Co., which built and sold 
the homes, negligently constructed them 
without regard to soil conditions. 
Plaintiffs joined the Great Western 
Savings and Loan Association on the 
basis that it had a real role in financing 
the development. Plaintiff claimed that 
the Association was liable either as a 
joint enterpriser with the developer or 
on a separate duty of care to the plain-
tiffs. Plaintiffs were nonsuited in the 
trial and appealed. The supreme court 
reversed by a vote of 4 to 3. The 
majority found a duty to be exercised 
by the Association even if there was no 
privity of contract, since the duty may 
be found on the basis of public policy. 
The duty was to protect plaintiffs from 
seriously defective construction, defec-
tive plans, and defective inspections. 
Negligence of the builders was not a 
superseding cause. The court again 
reviewed §§ 447 and 449 of the Restate-
ment. The case will undergo consider-
able study and discussion, and financing 
organizations will have to be much 
more careful of their procedures. They 
will have to think not only about the 
safety of their investments, but also 
whether the rights of future owners are 
protected. 
3. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 
285, 297 P. 91 (1931). 
4. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
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ance,S the right to be free from injuries created by negligently 
inflicted mental disturbance,6 and the right to recover for 
mental shock with resulting physical injury from viewing 
a close relative negligently subjected to serious danger and 
injury.7 The opposing argument is that recognition of such 
rights would open a veritable Pandora's box from which 
would flow fraudulent, fictitious, faked, intangible, untrust-
worthy, illusory, speculative, and extravagant claims. There 
would be floods of litigation, the argument goes, in which 
damages could not be proved even with much perjured testi-
mony. Experience with these cases shows that such fears 
have not been justified. They have been proved unfounded, 
for the judicial process has been able to separate the genuine 
from the fraudulent. Yet these arguments are being made 
regularly by our pessimists who can still feel the stomachache 
in the apple blossoms. 
Products Liability or Strict Liability 
As is to be expected, a number of cases have arisen in which 
plaintiffs have sought the advantages of this type of liability 
in which contributory negligence is not a defense, and in 
which negligence need not be proved save by showing that 
the products were defective when they left the factory and 
have not been substantially changed since then. The most 
thorough analysis of this cause of action during the year ap-
pears in Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co.s A Goodrich tire 
blew out and the damages were substantial. The judgment 
for Barth was for $207,375 and the guests in the car were 
awarded a total of $6,000. The case was tried vigorously, 
with able counsel on both sides. Anyone reading this opinion 
will profit greatly in finding what procedures he should follow 
with reference to the care to be taken with his tires; over-
loading and abnormal speeds do have a bearing on the per-
5. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. 7. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 
Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968). 
(1952). 8. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
6. Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital, 114 306 (1968). For further discussion of 
Cal. App.2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952). this case, see York, REMEDIES, in this 
volume. 
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formance of tires. Of course, here the company was held lia-
ble largely because it had not warned users as to these matters. 
Probably competition prevents reference to the limitations that 
might induce buyers to buy elsewhere. Perhaps the rare 
recovery because of tire failures justifies the policy not to 
emphasize these limitations. How many of us keep our speeds 
down because of the pbssibility of a blowout? This opinion, 
with all the expert testimony, is enlightening. Do we ac-
celerate sharply on a curve when to do so increases danger 
greatly? Overloading and excessive speeds could very well 
have prevented the plaintiff from winning this case if it had 
been a straight negligence case; but in a strict liability case, 
only use with actual knowledge of defects operates to defeat 
the plaintiff's case. 
Thus we can say that the big hurdle for the attorneys for 
Goodrich was the fact that their client failed to warn of dan-
gers for overloading and excessive speeds. The failure to 
warn was the defect. The facts were unclear whether there 
were actual defects in the tire though there was some evidence 
that such defects might have existed. Mrs. Barth was driving 
a 1961 Chevrolet station wagon equipped with Goodrich tires 
when the left rear tire blew out, causing the car to go out of 
control and over an embankment. Mrs. Barth was killed and 
her four passengers injured. Mr. Barth, for himself and their 
two children, sued for the wrongful death of Mrs. Barth, and 
the injured passengers joined in the suit. The car was a 
company car, which Mrs. Barth was authorized to drive. In 
November, 1961, the owner arranged to have two new Silver-
town tires placed on the car by Perry and Whitlow, wholesale 
and retail distributors for Goodrich in San Francisco; the tires 
were guaranteed against blowouts for 24 months. The acci-
dent occurred in April, 1962, after the tires had been in use 
for some five months. Two additional tires had been placed 
on the car in December, 1961. Accordingly, all tires were 
new. The suits were brought against Goodrich, manufacturer, 
and Perry and Whitlow, distributors and installers. The car 
had been used in business, and with a trailer attached. There 
was much evidence that the tires were overloaded at times, 
and that Goodrich knew that such tires were subject to over-
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loading but never advised the public or particular customers 
to that effect. There was much expert testimony on over-
loading to show that the tire was not used as intended. 
The jury returned a verdict against Goodrich in favor of 
all plaintiffs, but in favor of the distributor-installer. Good-
rich appealed, and the plaintiffs appealed the judgment for 
the installer. Goodrich made these arguments on appeal: (a) 
The issue of strict liability should not have been submitted 
because the evidence showed that the use of the tire was not 
as intended in that there was excessive speed, and that there 
had been overloading. The court's position was that the tires 
had been checked regularly and the public had never been 
advised of the danger of overloading, nor of the fact that 
speeds enhance tire dangers. (b) The court erred in not 
giving Goodrich's requested instruction on burden of proof 
to the effect that if the jury found that it was just as probable 
that the accident was proximately caused by some misuse 
or abuse of the tires as by the defect in the tire, the verdict 
should be for the defendant. The court stated that such 
instruction was held erroneous in Alvarez v. Felker Manu-
facturing Co. O (c) Goodrich claimed it was error to instruct 
that contributory negligence was not a defense. But Restate-
ment, section 402A, comment (n) and the cases hold that 
it definitely is not a defense unless it amounts to assumption 
of risk, which would mean that the plaintiff used the product 
with knowledge of the defect. This is the rule in Seely v. 
White Motor Co. IO and Canifax v. Hercules. lo.l There was no 
evidence that the Barths knew of any defects, and there was 
no evidence of any use not sanctioned, so there could have 
been no contributory negligence. But it was proper, said the 
court, to tell the jury of the defects, as there was evidence 
of experts on both sides that there were defects. And the 
word "defect" includes not only clear defects, but also the 
9. 230 Cal. App.2d 987,41 Cal. Rptr. 
514 (1964). 
10. 63 Cal.2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 
403 P.2d 145 (1965). 
10.1. 237 Cal. App.2d 44, 46 Cal. 
Rptr. 552 (1965). See also Vander-
394 CAL LAW 1969 
mark v. Ford Molar Co., 61 Cal.2d 
256, 37 Cal. Rpir. 896, 391 P.2d 16R 
(1964), and Prosser, Strict Liahility 10 
Ihe Consumer in California, 18 Hast. 
LJ. 9 (1966). 
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failure to urge care to do certain things or warn not to do 
other things which will cause danger. The failure to warn 
is a defect. Gherna v. Ford Motor Co.n Section 402A, 
comment (j) of the Restatement is in accord that the product 
is deemed defective if placed on the market without adequate 
warnings. ( d) Goodrich also claimed that the fact that the 
tires were sold by the trade name of Silvertown prevents lia-
bility for implied warranties. But here the trade name was 
used only for identification purposes, so that plaintiff still 
could rely on the warranty .12 ( e) Goodrich claimed that 
Barth's guests, the Clarks, could not take advantage of the 
warranties because there was no privity of contract. But prod-
ucts liability is liability in tort and so privity is no longer 
necessary.13 See also Vandemark v. Ford Motor CO.,14 where 
a sister of the owner recovered; Gutierrez v. Superior Court,15 
where the guest of an inn recovered; Peterson v. Lamb Rubber 
CO.;16 and Alvarez.17 (f) Goodrich also claimed that the 
court erred in not telling the jury that a speed of more than 
65 miles per hour would constitute a rebuttable presumption 
of negligence. As a matter of fact, the instruction told the 
jury that such a speed violation would be negligence as a 
matter of law, so the given instruction was more favorable 
to Goodrich than the one requested; so it could not have been 
prejudicial. 
On the Barth and Clark appeals from the judgment in favor 
of the distributor, the latter's role in the distributive process 
must be examined. The owner of the Chevrolet advised 
11. 246 Cal. App.2d 639, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 94 (1966). 
12. See Odell v. Freuh, 146 Cal. App. 
2d 504, 304 P.2d 45, 76 A.L.R.2d 345 
(1956). 
13. Of course the leading case on 
the elimination of the old requirement 
is MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 
217 N.Y. 382, III N.E. 1050 (1916). 
14. 61 Cal.2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 
391 P.2d 168 (1964). 
15. 243 Cal. App.2d 710, 52 Cal. 
Rptr. 592 (1966). 
16. 54 Cal.2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 
353 P.2d 575 (1960). Here the court 
held that an employee using a defec-
tively made tool could be held in privity 
with the vendor manufacturer so as to 
have the benefit of implied warranties. 
This was pre-Greenman, which was 
decided in 1963. If privity was needed, 
then the court would find it. 
17. 230 Cal. App.2d 987, 41 Cal. 
Rptr. 514 (1964). 
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Barth, its employee, that two Silvertown tires for the Chevrolet 
had been ordered through a Goodrich distributor in the Mid-
west similar to Perry and Whitlow. Perry and Whitlow sent 
the invoice to Goodrich and received a service charge for 
handling the matter and $40.00 credit for the tires removed 
from their stock; they also received $4.13 for the mounting 
of the tires. The court had instructed that unless Perry and 
Whitlow had sold the tires they could not be held liable. The 
jury accordingly held for the distributors on the theory that 
they had not been sellers. That is, the selling was necessary 
to ground strict liability. But the appellate court held that 
the definition of sale under the old terminology was inaccurate 
for the applicability of tort liability. Under Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc.,18 and section 402A of the Restatement, 
one who sells any product in a defective condition to the user 
or consumer is liable to such user or consumer if the seller 
is engaged in the business of selling such product and it reaches 
the receiver in the same condition. The rule applies although 
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation 
and sale, and it also applies although the user has not brought 
the product from or entered into any contractual relation 
with the seller. The comment (f) to section 402A explains 
that those liable include manufacturers, wholesalers, retail 
dealers, or distributors; the important thing is that all parties 
who are integral parts of the overall producing or marketing 
process, or enterprise, are included. Of course Perry argues 
that his firm was a mere conduit between the plaintiff and the 
manufacturer. But the firm was clearly more than that, as 
indicated by the fact that the tires came from their stock, that 
they received credit therefor, and also that they mounted the 
tires and were paid for so doing. They were distributors and 
so fell within the rule of the Restatement and the cases. 
A second case, also involving an alleged defect in an auto-
mobile, is Waters v. American Motors Corporation. 19 A car 
again went out of control and resulted in the death of the 
18. 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 19. 263 Cal. App.2d -, 69 Cal. Rptr. 
377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1963). 799 (1968) hearing granted August 28, 
1968. 
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driver. A Rambler was purchased new by Mrs. Elmore in 
March, 1962, and the accident happened six weeks after the 
purchase and after the car had been driven less than 3,000 
miles. Mrs. Elmore thought the car shimmied, but her hus-
band was not certain about it. But if it shimmied, it was 
after the speed was over 65 miles per hour. On the day of the 
accident, Mrs. Elmore was driving on a three-lane road and 
while passing another car and while going 60 to 65 miles per 
hour, her car suddenly fishtailed and went over the center 
lane and crashed into the Waters car, killing Mr. Waters and 
injuring Mrs. Waters, who sued her for her injuries and the 
wrongful death of her husband; Mrs. Elmore sought damages 
for her injuries. 
Thus the claims of Mrs. Elmore were by a user, but those 
of the Waters family were as bystanders or non-users. If a 
defect in the car was established we would then have had a 
case on the rights of bystanders to recover under the doctrine 
of strict liability. The trial court heard the evidence and 
entered a nonsuit which the district court of appeal affirmed. 
In order to make a cause of action it was up to the plaintiff 
to show that the car was defective when it was sold and that 
the defect caused the injuries and death involved. 
Motorists following the Rambler testified that some metal 
seemed to be dragging beneath the car, and sparks were 
emanating from under it as the car was fishtailing across 
the highway. It seemed as if the drive-shaft had become 
disconnected at one end, and the marks on the highway showed 
that something had dug into the paving. In addition to the 
alleged dropping of a part of the mechanism of the car, 
there was also a claim of the shimmying of the car and of 
foreign particles in the gear box. The court concluded that 
the shimmying was not proved as the cause of the wreck 
because Mrs. Elmore was not driving at the speed required 
for the shimmying; so if there had been shimmying, it was 
not relevant. As to particles in the gear box, that was not 
proved. The question narrows down, then, to the alleged 
defect of parts of the car becoming dislodged and causing 
the wreck. The court states that the part was neither pro-
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duced nor identified. So the whole case rests on what infer-
ences can be made from what evidence is produced. Several 
cases are cited to the effect that when a defect is not specifi-
cally proved, the plaintiff cannot have the benefit of the 
inference unless all other possible causes of the accident are 
negatived. No manufacturing flaw or inadequate design was 
presented; hence the need of negativing other possible causes. 
The court relies on Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,20 and 
Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing,l both New 
Jersey cases. 
The importance of Waters lies in what it says about prov-
ing a case of this kind; i.e., it does not prove itself. Infer-
ences are to be made, but not lightly. Plaintiff must show 
(a) that there was a defect in the car when it left the dealer, 
(b) proper use, and (c) that the injury is traceable to the 
defect, i.e. it must be causal. It was the court's decision that 
these requirements were not met. Readers should examine 
Gherna,2 in this connection. It will be recalled that in Gherna, 
a fire developed almost spontaneously in a two-month-old 
Thunderbird when the owner had driven it to his job and 
had walked away from it about 100 feet. All that was left 
to infer was that a new automobile does "not suddenly develop 
a fire in the engine compartment without someone's negli-
gence". The court concluded that the plaintiff's cause could 
be sustained as negligence proved with the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, or on strict liability by inference, or on breach 
of warranty. But is it not equally true that parts do not drop 
off of new cars without someone's negligence? Of course 
as the Thunderbird in Gherna was not being driven, other 
causes of the accident would not have to be negatived. The 
driving of the Thunderbird was not involved, but that of 
Mrs. Elmore's Rambler was.2•l 
20. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.C. 615, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 
A.L.R.2d 1 (1960). 84, March 1968, reversed the Court of 
1. 42 N.I. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964). Appeal on two major phases of the case: 
2. 246 Cal. App.2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. (1) a car with a falling drive shaft is a 
94 (1966). defective car forming a basis for liabil-
2.1. Since the discussion of Waters ity under the doctrine of strict liability 
was written, the Supreme Court, 70 and (2) a third person, a mere by-
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The applicability of products and strict liability to real 
estate transactions is considered in Conolley v. Bull.3 De-
fendant Bull, was a real estate developer and speculator in 
residential property, and he obtained a permit to build a 
home on his sloping lot in Contra Costa County, then hired 
a contractor to build the house. Defendant testified that he 
was not present when the foundation was put in but that 
he knew the piers went down 12 feet. No soil tests were 
made before construction; a neighbor talked to defendant 
and asked if he knew there was a slide condition in the lot, 
and defendant said not to worry about it. The neighbor 
wrote him a letter telling him that if any damage to his 
property resulted because of the construction he would look 
to defendant for damages. Defendant Bull sold the property 
to Conolley, who raised questions about a culvert which 
emptied onto the place. But upon being assured that the 
house was built safely, he bought it. Plaintiff took possession 
in October or November, 1961, though the escrow was not 
to be closed until February 16, 1962. On that date, while 
it was raining, a landslide occurred. On February 19, plain-
tiffs served notice of rescission on defendants but later asked 
for damages in the alternative. A soil specialist testified for 
plaintiffs that he found 2-! feet of fill on the place, and that 
fill is prone to slide; he and another expert testified that in 
such a situation a soil test should be made, and that it was 
customary to do so in Contra Costa County. At the trial, 
the court stated to counsel that there was evidence of negli-
gence and evidence that might call for the application of the 
rule of strict liability in tort as declared in Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products. 4 The cause of action was originally for 
rescission but it was amended to allege negligence and strict 
liability. The trial court found that: (a) defendant was 
negligent in building without providing adequate soil drain-
age; (b) as a real estate developer he failed to arrange for 
stander, is entitled to recover for dam-
ages resulting from such defect. 
3. 258 Cal. App.2d 183,65 Cal. Rptr. 
689 (1968). 
4. 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 
377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 
(1963). 
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suitable drainage; and (c) he was "absolutely liable" to plain-
tiffs for such failure, in the sum of $9,925.00. The amend-
ments were proper as it was simply a change of legal theory 
on the facts proved. So there was no prejudice from the 
variance in pleading.5 Experts had testified that the failure 
to have proper drainage caused the slide, so there was no 
surprise as to the facts, and the cause for negligence was 
sustained. 
Our special interest here, however, is to note whether the 
doctrine of strict liability is applicable to such a case as this. 
The status of the law on the matter is covered concisely on 
pages 842 to 847 of Prosser and Smith, Cases on Torts, fourth 
edition. The New Jersey case-Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 
Inc. 6 applies the doctrine in a case where the defendant was 
developing real estate. As Prosser states, "To date of publi-
cation, this New Jersey case stands alone imposing strict 
liability, without privity upon the builder-vendor. It has not 
been followed nor rejected. Will it be followed?" The case 
has been cited many times in the past two years, with no clear 
holding in accord. The district court of appeal in Conolley 
refused to apply the strict liability rule to the facts of the case. 
It pointed out that in Halliday v. Green,7 the court expressly 
refused to hold the builder of an apartment house liable on 
the products liability doctrine where tenants were injured 
from a fall in a defectively built staircase. The same ruling 
is made in Sabella v. Wisler,s as to liability for construction 
on a loose fill, and in Dow v. Hol/y,9 as to liability for installing 
a defective gas heater. In each of the latter cases the con-
tractor's liability was rested on proof of negligence. The 
Halliday case notes the differences between strict products 
liability for manufacturing a product anl for construction of 
real estate as follows: (a) The builder is seldom in a position 
5. In Read v. Safeway Stores Inc., 
264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 454 
(1968), the plaintiff had initially pro-
ceded on a theory of negligence. The 
trial court's refusal to allow plaintiff 
to change the theory of his case to strict 
liability was held to be error. 
400 CA L LAW 1969 
6. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). 
7. 244 Cal. App.2d 482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
267 (1966). 
8. 59 CaI.2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 
377 P.2d 889 (1963). 
9. 49 Cal.2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 
(1958). 
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to limit his liabilities by express warranties and disclaimers 
and thereby defeat recovery by an occupant in a defectively 
constructed building. (b) It is much less difficult for the 
occupant to trace the defect in a building than to trace the 
fault in a complex manufactured product, so the need for 
such a rigid rule is less pronounced. ( c) The buyer of a 
building can always make a very careful check-a meaningful 
inspection. The Halliday case points out that if strict liability 
were available, the plaintiff would profit in two ways: (a) It 
would relieve him of showing the privity of tenants with the 
builder; (b) All we would need to show is a defective 
condition-not that it was negligently constructed. And Dow 
points out the similarity to MacPherson v. Buick:10 "There is 
. a close analogy between a supplier of chattels and a 
general contractor for the construction of abuilding." Al-
though Dow flirts with the MacPherson reasoning, the basis 
of its decision is on negligence. Prosser sees no real distinc-
tion between suppliers of chattels and suppliers of homes. l1 
As we go to press the second division of the district court 
of appeal (San Francisco) has held, in Kriegler v. Eichler 
Homes, Inc./2 that a supplier of homes is liable in strict 
liability. The court cites Prosser and Schipper. 
A brief look at Harris v. Belton and similar cases13 seems 
justified. Harris involves the sale of cosmetics. Plaintiff 
used a widely advertised "Skin Tone Cream" which she 
claimed burned, irritated, scarred, and darkened her skin. 
She sued the manufacturer and the retailer for breach of 
express waranty, on the basis of the advertising, and of 
implied warranty on the basis that the product was not mer-
chantable. The court gave consideration to possible liability 
on the strict theory of Greenman and similar cases. The evi-
dence showed that the product affected two percent of users 
10. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 
(1916). 
11. Prosser, Law of Torts, 3d ed., p. 
693. 
12. 269 Cal. App.2d -, 74 Cal. Rptr. 
749 (1969). 
26 
13. 258 Cal. App.2d 595, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 808 (1968). See also Cochran v. 
Brooke, 243 Ore. 89, 409 P.2d 904 
(1966); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, 
Inc., 251 Cal. App.2d 689, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. 398 (1967); and Lewis v. Baker, 
243 Ore. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966). 
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adversely, such people probably being allergic to some of the 
ingredients in the product. But each bottle contained due 
warning of this danger. The judgment for the defendant 
was affirmed. Thus the decision follows the pattern usually 
applied in such cases. See comments (i) and (j) of section 
402A of the Torts Restatement. 
Res Ipsa Loquitur 
Res Ipsa Loquitur-in Rear-end Collisions. In McHale v. 
Hall/4 we have a clear rear-end collision that brings into 
play three basic principles of the law of negligence: (a) 
statutory violation, (b) imminent peril, and (c) res ipsa 
loquitur. The first two deal with liability, the third with 
proof. Mrs. McHale was driving the family Volkswagen with 
her three children. She was going east, intending to make 
a left turn some short distance from the crest of a gradually 
sloping downward hill. She stated she was driving 15 to 20 
miles per hour and gradually slowed down on approaching 
the intersection. When very near the intersection, the car 
was rear-ended by the Hall car. Mrs. McHale gave no hand 
signal indicating a turn, and the left directional blinker on 
the Volkswagen was out of order, as was the brake light. At 
the top of the crest, Hall had been driving 45 to 50 miles 
per hour, a lawful speed. Seeing the McHale car 200 feet 
from the intersection, he reduced his speed. When 125 feet 
from the Volkswagen, he first realized she intended a turn. 
He applied his brakes vigorously but was unable to stop in 
time. 
The McHales sued for damage to their Volkswagen and 
on behalf of their injured child. The jury brought in a verdict 
for defendant. The court instructed that the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur applied to rear-end cases, but that the doctrine 
of imminent peril applied in defendant's favor since he sud-
denly saw plaintiff was going to stop. So res ipsa loquitur was 
against him, but imminent peril was in his favor. The negli-
gence of the defendant being in issue, the jury must resolve 
14. 257 Cal. App.2d 342, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 694 (1967). 
402 CAL LAW 1969 
30
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 15
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/15
Torts 
the conflicting facts and presumptions. Likewise Mrs. Mc-
Hale's failure to give the signal was a statutory violation, 
giving rise to a presumption of contributory negligence on her 
part, so the jury could find that this failure was the sole cause 
of the accident. Rarely does one find three such fundamental 
principles interacting in a simple lawsuit.16 
Res Ipsa Loquitur and Medical Practice. In Belshwaw v. 
Feinstein/6 a patient who later died was afflicted with Parkin-
son's disease, and Dr. Feinstein performed stereotaxic surgery, 
a procedure with a calculated risk of mortality of one per-
cent. The surgeon's technique is fully described in the court's 
opinion. There were questions of why and how the plaintiff's 
brain was cut and damaged during the operation, whetlIer 
it was a negligently used trephining instrument or just a pull-
ing away of the dura from the bone. But the doctor stated 
it was a "possibility" that it had been cut. The doctor did 
not inform the patient's wife of this possibility; on the con-
trary he told her the patient suffered a stroke or complications. 
Only twice out of 900 of such cases had doctors cut the brain, 
so the result was a rarity. The trial court gave a conditional 
res ipsa loquitur instruction, indicating that the jury could find 
that the injury was due to negligence if, in the light of past 
experience, it probably was due to negligence and that the 
defendant was probably the person responsible.17 In deter-
mining whether such a probability exists, courts normally have 
relied on facts being of common knowledge or the testimony 
of expert witnesses. 
The mere fact of rarity or low incidence of the occurrence 
alone is not sufficient to produce an inference of negligence. 
Because it is often difficult to get medical men to testify 
against the interests of the profession, the California courts 
15. The use of res ipsa loquitur in 
rear-ending cases is well analyzed in 
Davis v. Ewen, 148 Cal. App.2d 410, 
306 P.2d 908 (1957), and the signifi-
cance of a brake failure in such a case 
is stated by the supreme court in Clark 
v. Dziabas, 69 Cal.2d 449, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
901, 445 P.2d 517 (1968). See also 
Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal.2d 442, 71 
Cal. Rptr. 897, 445 P.2d 513 (1968). 
16. 258 Cal. App.2d 711, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 788 (1968). 
17. Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal.2d 834, 
22 Cal. Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97 (1962). 
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have treated the fact of low incidence as one element which 
may be combined with other evidence of negligence, so that 
the likelihood of a negligent cause may be sufficiently great 
that the jury may conclude that the accident was more prob-
ably than not the result of someone's negligence. IS 
The doctrine, then, permits the jury to draw an inference 
of negligence in this case. This was obviously a situation 
in which common knowledge could not apply. Also, accord-
ing to the testimony of the experts, all that happened was 
quite expectable and calculated. So neither common knowl-
edge nor expert testimony was available. True, there was 
low incidence. Was there specific evidence of negligence to 
go with the fact of low incidence to satisfy the requirements 
of Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital,19 and Clark v. Gibbons?20 
The court found such evidence in defendant's uncertainty as 
to whether he cut the dura or whether it just tore away, and 
in the fact that the adjustment of the trephine was possibly 
inaccurate. Also, defendant told the patient's family that 
he had suffered a stroke, which was untrue. The judgment 
for $155,000 for the plaintiff was affirmed. 
A more recent medical case is Rawlings v. Harris. 1 The 
facts are less complex, involving just a pan-hysterectomy in 
which defendant surgeon sutured the patient's ureter, causing 
the uncontrolled flowage of urine. The trial court refused to 
give the conditional res ipsa loquitur instruction, and the 
defendant won a verdict. The appellate court ruled that 
the instruction should have been given and therefore ordered 
a new trial. This case seems to be clear, for the experts 
were not in agreement here; they differed sharply. In the 
previous case there was full agreement, and so some other 
justification for the use of the doctrine had to be found. 
Clark v. Gibbons2 and Tomei v. HenningS are relied on. As 
the court explains, it is not for the court, but for the jury 
18. Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal.2d 399, 1. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
58 Cal. Rptr. 125,426 P.2d 525 (1967). 288 (1968). 
19. 62 Cal.2d 154,41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 2. 66 Cal.2d 399, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 
397 P.2d 161 (1965). 426 P.2d 525 (1967). 
20. 66 Cal.2d 399, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3. 67 Cal.2d 319, 62 Cal. Rptr. 9, 
125,426 P.2d 525 (1967). 431 P.2d 633 (1967). 
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to determine the existence of facts justifying the application 
of the doctrine. This is why it is called a conditional instruc-
tion. Here the plaintiff's expert had testified that the injury 
involved is always caused by negligence. This was more 
definite than the situation in Clark v. Gibbons,4 in which the 
expert witness for the defendant was induced to make admis-
sions by a careful cross-examination by plaintiff's counsel. 
Res Ipsa Loquitur and Strict Liability. Casetta v. United 
States Rubber Co. 5 involves a suit by a tire repairman who 
was injured by an explosion which occurred while he was 
putting a new tire on a rim. Suit was against the manufac-
turer and distributor, and plaintiff had a verdict against both 
for $58,500. The court, however, gave judgment for the 
defendants notwithstanding the verdict. The theories of the 
suit included negligence of defendants, breach of implied war-
ranty of fitness of the tires, and strict liability in tort. The 
evidence in this case is detailed and complicated; the proce-
dure for mounting tires is thoroughly examined for possible 
failure to proceed properly and for contributory negligence. 
But we are concerned here with the relation of res ipsa loquitur 
to strict liability of manufacturers, retailers, and distributors. 
We have already noted, in our discussion of Barth v. Goodrich 
Tire CO.,6 that the distributor was held equally liable with 
the manufacturer if he was involved in the marketing and 
had a definite part in the whole transaction. The Casetta 
opinion contains a complete citation of strict liability cases 
beginning with Greenman.7 It restates the usual three require-
ments for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine: 
(a) the accident must be one that does not ordinarily occur 
without negligence on the part of someone; (b) the instru-
mentality must be under the defendant's exclusive control; 
and (c) the plaintiff must not have contributed to the acci-
dent. If tires are properly manufactured they do not explode 
when being mounted. The defendants still had control in the 
absence of a showing that the condition of the tire had been 
4. 66 Cal.2d 399, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 6. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
426 P.2d 525 (1967). 306 (1968). 
5. 260 Cal. App.2d 792, 67 Cal. Rptr. 7. 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 
645 (1968). 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1963). 
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changed since leaving the defendant's plant. As to the plain-
tiff's participation or contribution, the parties were in a defi-
nite clash. And in such case the jury decides, under proper 
instructions, whether the inference of negligence can be made. 
On the basis of the thorough testimony of defendant's 
experts, the court determined that there was no basis for a 
finding that the explosion was due to a defect in the tire 
when it left the manufacturing plant, and therefore the court 
properly rendered judgment for the defendants notwithstand-
ing the verdict on plaintiff's theory that there was a defect 
in the tire. 
The finding, however, that there was a failure to warn the 
plaintiff of the dangers inherent in the mounting of tires 
gives a basis for holding the manufacturer liable for failure 
to give adequate warning of any dangerous usages which it 
knows or should have known would result in the type of acci-
dent that occurred. It cites Gherna,8 as well as others, and 
Restatement section 402A. Some warnings were actually 
given and posted, but the manufacturers also knew that these 
warnings and suggested precautions were more honored by 
their breach than by their observance; therefore special warn-
ings should have been given, especially when safety rims were 
used. The extent to which the warnings were communicated 
was in dispute. The plaintiff had offered several instructions 
on failure to warn as a basis for finding the product defective.9 
The court therefore ordered a new trial covering the warnings 
given and communicated and also their relation to the issues 
of the defective product. A product without adequate warning 
is defective. Certainly Gherna clearly establishes that res ipsa 
loquitur is available for proving the negligence of a manu-
facturer, and the jury may find strict liability by drawing the 
inference from the circumstances, which is what is done in 
res ipsa cases. The trial court only decides whether plaintiff 
has produced sufficient evidence to permit the jury to draw 
the inference, in either case. 
8. 246 Cal. App.2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 9. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 
94 (1967). 237 Cal. App.2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 
(1965). 
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In McCurter v. Norton Co.,I° plaintiff was injured by an 
abrasive wheel on a machine. The court held that res ipsa 
loquitur could not apply because the wheel was not in the 
same condition as it was when it left the defendant's plant. 
But the court issued a further caveat on its use. The basic 
fact in strict liability cases is that the manufacturer placed a 
product on the market in a defective condition. A defect must 
be shown. Can such a defect be shown by the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur? The court here denies that this can be 
done. It says specifically that "when a party relies on the 
rule of strict liability the requirement of showing a defect 
cannot be satisfied by reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur." The fact is, however, that the plaintiff fails here 
because the defendant has an affirmative defense, to wit, the 
product has been changed over the time that has passed since 
the wheel came from the manufacturer. Too much time had 
passed, and the product had been used a great deal. The 
manufacturer had lost control, but there are many cases in 
which the product has passed into the hands of others and the 
doctrine is still applicable. l1 Of course, it can be said that 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not prevail over affirma-
tive defenses such as assumption of risk, which means using 
the product with knowledge that it is defective, and in such 
case the use would be improper and abnormal. It can be 
said that strict liability can be gotten by inference from 
circumstances which may be different from the requirements 
for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is probably given more 
liberal treatment in its use in California than in any other state. 
Certainly this is true since Ybarra v. Spangard,I2 which allowed 
the jury to draw the inference even against the testimony of 
all persons who were in the operating room with the injured 
patient. The idea is that we should make the people who 
were on hand explain what happened. This was also true in 
10. 263 Cal. App.2d 402, 69 Cal. U.S. Rubber Co., 260 Cal. App.2d 792, 
Rptr. 493 (1968). 67 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1968). 
11. See, for example, Gherna v. Ford 12. 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 
Motor Co., 246 Cal. App.2d 639, 55 162 AL.R. 1258 (1944). 
Cal. Rptr. 94 (1967) and Casetta v. 
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Summers v. Tice. 13 Res ipsa is simply a method of proving 
a general allegation of negligence, and it will also support 
allegations of specific negligence if the petition contains a 
general allegation as well as specific allegations.14 The dan-
gers of its over-use prompt many jurists to call for a halt in 
its liberal extension. This has been especially true in medical 
cases. The medical profession would favor the theory of the 
calculated risk. It is a problem of finding suitable grounds 
for indulging the inference of negligence. Requiring facts 
of common knowledge or expert testimony as to professional 
matters would surely be adequate bases for the inference, but 
rarity and low incidence should be coupled with something 
fairly substantial. The cases examined here indicate a further 
liberalization in the use of res ipsa loquitur. 
Last Clear Chance-Looking and Not Seeing 
The last clear chance doctrine makes interesting study in 
California because the doctrine is designed to allow a plaintiff 
to recover notwithstanding contributory negligence, and Cali-
fornia is a state in which contributory negligence is still 
recognized as a strong defense.15 Moreover, Civil Code sec-
tion 1714 provides that a plaintiff can recover for injuries 
occasioned by another "except so far as the latter (the 
plaintiff) has wilfully or by want of ordinary care, brought 
the injury upon himself." So the code strengthens the judicial 
rule. Last clear chance abrogates the defense of contributory 
negligence. When is the doctrine applicable? In fitting it 
into tort theory it has been said that defendant's conduct is 
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also can appear 
as almost an infliction of intentional injury if the act is done 
with actual knowledge of plaintiff's predicament. Putting 
it in terms of proximate cause relates it to an element of the 
cause of action for negligence. But as Prosser points out, it 
13. 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 5 15. Myers v. Carini 262 Cal. App.2d 
A.L.R.2d 91 (1948). 614, 68 Cal. Rptr 800 (1968). 
14. Atkinson v. United Railroads of 
San Francisco, 71 Cal. App. 82, 234 P. 
863 (1925). 
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is difficult to find any uniformity of thinking in application 
of the doctrine. 16 
Basically four types of last clear chance have evolved as 
follows: ( a) Defendant discovers the plain tiff in physical 
peril from which he cannot extricate himself. (b) Defendant 
discovers plaintiff clearly oblivious of his peril but able to 
extricate himself if he knew his predicament (in California 
this is called inattentiveness). (c) Plaintiff is in physical 
peril and unable to extricate himself, and defendant does not 
discover him in that situation; and (d) Plaintiff is in peril 
because he is inattentive, or oblivous, or unaware, and again 
the defendant does not discover him. The last type is what 
is known as the humanitarian rule applied in Missouri. But 
the writer still has not found a Missouri lawyer who would 
claim that if a railroad engineer failed to discover a drunk 
sleeping on a track in the middle of a great wheat field, the 
company would be liable. The usual Missouri cases where 
there is a duty to discover are intersection cases. The progres-
sion of theories of last clear chance from (a) to (d) leads 
to a situation where a defendant has the duty to discover 
a plaintiff, who is innocently or negligently inattentive, and 
take care of him. You are now your brother's keeper. Often 
the word "unconscious" is substituted for the word "undis-
covered" in describing defendant's state of mind as to plain-
tiff's position of danger. 
Our problem is to try to ascertain just where California 
draws the line: under what conditions is the doctrine appli-
cable? Just when is the defense of contributory negligence 
abrogated? In Brandelius v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco/7 the Supreme Court of California undertook to draw 
this line. A passenger alighting from a cable car was fatally 
struck by another cable car going in the opposite direction, 
and suit was for his wrongful death. The case is clouded 
because the carrier-passenger relation would place added duties 
on the carrier, but the jury was to determine if that relation 
16. Prosser, Law oj Torts, 3d ed p. 17. 47 Ca1.2d 729, 306 P.2d 432 
438. (1957). See also Girdner v. Union Oil 
Co., 216 Cal. 197, 13 P.2d 915 (1932). 
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has ended. So the doctrine must be considered on the basis 
that the carrier-passenger relation had terminated. The for-
mula announced by the court is: 
( 1) That plaintiff has been negligent and as a result thereof 
he is in a position of danger from which he cannot extricate 
himself or escape by the exercise of ordinary care, and this 
includes the situation where his danger is due to his inatten-
tiveness. 
(2) The defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff is in 
a position of danger and knows, or in the exercise of ordinary 
care should know, that plaintiff cannot escape. It should be 
noted that it is sufficient that defendant should know that 
plaintiff cannot escape; actual knowledge of this fact is not 
necessary. 
(3) Defendant has the last clear chance to avoid the acci-
dent by the exercise of ordinary care, fails to do so, and the 
proximate result is that plaintiff is injured. Is 
Hence, the doctrine takes effect when defendant has actual 
knowledge of plaintiff's position of danger and actual or con-
structive knowledge of his inability to escape from the danger. 
It will be appreciated, of course, that the liberal doctrine 
begins when a duty to find out about plaintiff's danger is 
required. If defendant knows of plaintiff's predicament, it 
is not much to ask him to prevent injury.19 This can be illus-
trated by a case where plaintiff is walking down a railroad 
track and the engineer sees him. He has actual knowledge 
of plaintiff being in a position of danger-but he has no duty 
to stop his train until he knows, or should know, by the exer-
cise of ordinary care, that plaintiff is not going to escape, 
either because he is caught in a trap or is totally unaware that 
a train is coming. 
In California the defendant must have actual knowledge of 
plaintiff's position of danger, but constructive knowledge of 
his inability to escape is sufficient. Once the danger is known, 
it is reasonable to assume that defendant must observe the 
18. Doran v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 44 Cal.2d 477, 283 P.2d 1 
(1955). 
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plaintiff to see if he is going to save himself. And when a 
reasonable person in defendant's position would realize that 
the plaintiff was not going to act to save himself, then a 
duty arises for the defendant to take over. If the defendant 
has enough time available, and a clear chance to prevent 
injury, and fails to do so, the injury is the proximate result 
of such failure. With this analysis it would seem clear that 
the rule is far from the Missouri humanitarian doctrine, which 
places a duty to discover or know the plaintiff's position of 
danger at intersections and other places where plaintiff may 
be expected. 
The California rule seems to be more liberal when one 
can be charged with having seen what he would have seen 
had he looked. And if there is a duty to look, and there 
is such a duty to look at intersections, the defendant is charged 
with knowledge of what a look would have revealed. There 
is also the rule that one must act with due care under the 
circumstances. The looking and not seeing rule is well ac-
cepted. 
Now let us look at a few recent cases. 
In Philo v. Lancia,20 plaintiff was travelling south between 
40 and 45 miles per hour while defendant was driving west 
with his truck loaded with three tons of rock. It is an inter-
section case, usually a difficult matter to resolve. There were 
no obstructions to the drivers' views, no traffic signals, the 
weather was dry and both roads were paved. Plaintiff ap-
proached the intersection and noted defendant's truck some 
distance away. Defendant was not slowing down, so plaintiff 
sounded his horn when about 100 feet from the intersection, 
applied his brakes, and slid into the intersection. Defendant 
testified that when he first saw plaintiff's vehicle it was clear 
that plaintiff could not stop before entering the intersection, 
but he nevertheless put his foot on the accelerator in order 
to clear the intersection first. But on entering the intersection 
he applied his brakes and skidded into plaintiff's vehicle, 
leaving marks about 18 feet long. Plaintiff's tire marks were 
20. 256 Cal. App.2d 475, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 900 (1967). 
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over 100 feet long. The evidence was in sharp conflict as 
to which vehicle entered the intersection first. But the facts 
show that the defendant's truck would have stopped in time 
if he had had brakeage for another 3 to 5 feet. Under those 
facts the court instructed according to the last clear chance 
doctrine, and the giving of the instruction was set up as 
error. The district court of appeal affirmed. It indicated 
that when defendant testified that he looked both to the right 
and left and did not see plaintiff until the plaintiff sounded 
his horn, he disclosed that he was negligently inattentive as 
a matter of law. "Failure to keep a lookout to see that 
which can readily be seen if the driver is looking is negligence 
as a matter of law." The trial court gave the instruction on 
"looking and not seeing"l and under the facts, this was not 
error. Defendant claimed he was entitled to an instruction 
on his being confronted with an "imminent peril" situation 
and that the fact that he did not do what he might have done 
is not necessarily negligence. The court indicated that his 
conduct was properly held to have been negligent even with-
out any such instruction. This case seems to hold that the 
last clear chance doctrine was applicable because defendant 
failed to observe and failed to exercise care to discover plaintiff 
in a position of danger, and not because he failed to discover 
if he could escape. At least by holding him to have knowledge 
of what he would have seen had he looked, the court liberal-
ized the application of the doctrine. The defendant claimed 
he did not discover plaintiff until he sounded his horn. He 
may not have known plaintiff was there, but he was liable as 
if he had known. We are thus approaching "humanitarian-
ism" by "looking and not seeing". 
In Lopez v. Ormonde,2 two boys were riding a bicycle 
across an intersection after having pushed a traffic button 
giving them the "go" sign. Defendant's truck was making 
a right turn at the intersection and collided with the boys 
in the intersection, and one of the boys was killed under the 
dual wheels of the truck. As it was claimed that the boys 
1. See BAlI § 140. 
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were guilty of contributory negligence, it was error not to give 
the last clear chance instruction to destroy the possible defense. 
The last clear chance instruction requested is what is known 
as BAH No. 205 (Revised). This is substantially the same 
instruction as that developed in Brandelius.3 Yet defendant 
testified that he at no time observed the decedent prior to 
his death. But a passenger in the truck had seen the boys 
and warned the driver. The boys were in clear view of any 
reasonably observant person. The facts show adequate knowl-
edge despite the denial of knowledge. So here again we see an 
effort to liberalize the doctrine so far as requiring actual 
knowledge is concerned. 
In Lauder v. Jobe,4 which involved a chain of rear-end 
collisions, a truck was stopped on a freeway in the second lane 
from the center strip, and the driver was picking up something 
that had fallen off his truck. Lauder struck the rear of the 
truck. J obe was following Lauder and struck Lauder's car. 
Both cars were damaged, and both parties were injured. Cross 
actions were brought, one by Lauder and the other by J obe. 
So far as last clear chance is concerned, it seems clear that 
Lauder had negligently placed himself in a position of danger 
when he hit the truck and could not escape from that position, 
and that J obe saw the Lauder car up against the truck and 
not movable. So the issue here is whether Jobe saw the 
situation in time to do anything about it. Lauder testified 
that he was going 60 miles per hour so in six seconds he 
moved 540 feet. There was a strip of adequate width on 
the left to enable Jobe to avoid hitting Lauder. Also the evi-
dence showed that Jobe saw the position of Lauder for a 
distance of 700 feet. So the evidence showed that there was 
a last clear chance for J obe to avoid injuring Lauder. Thus, 
the thinking of the court in Brandelius is applied in this case. 
In Gillingham v. Greyhound Corporation,5 we have a good 
summary by Justice Bray restating the Brandelius formula 
3. 47 Cal. 2d 729, 306 P.2d 432 4. 261 Cal. App.2d 539,68 Cal. Rptr. 
(1957). See also People v. Walker, 266 63 (1968). 
Cal. App.2d -, 72 Cal. Rptr. 224 5. 263 Cal. App.2d 564, 69 Cal. 
(1968) and Fry v. Young, 267 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1968). 
App.2d -, 73 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1968). 
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and concluding quite properly that the doctrine was not appli-
cable to the facts. The Greyhound bus driver was following 
a car at a distance of about 100 feet at night when he saw 
something in the highway which turned out to be the body 
of the plaintiff who had been struck by the car immediately 
ahead of the bus. The driver, without a chance to stop, 
straddled and may have hit the body, which was not more than 
30 feet ahead of him when he saw it. The court considered 
Lauder v. lobe,6 but the facts were different. There was no 
evidence upon which the jury could find that the driver had any 
chance to avoid straddling and possibly hitting the body. The 
doctrine could not be held applicable. There was no chance, 
let alone a clear one. 
In conclusion we can assert that while the California courts 
emphasize that the plaintiff's position of danger must be 
discovered, the application of the doctrine approaches the 
humanitarian rule because the requirement of discovery is 
tempered by the duty to look for possible plaintiffs and by 
holding the defendant to have seen what he would have seen 
had he looked. This expands actual discovery to include a 
duty to discover. 
Shifting of Liability 
Indemnity Cases 
Indemnity is a broad term in law. It can mean restitution, 
complying with a guaranty, or reimbursement; it can mean 
subrogation on the theory that a benefit has been conferred 
which should be paid back. We speak of indemnity actions 
which aim to obtain a full reimbursement. In tort it means 
that where each of two persons is made responsible by law 
for damages suffered by an injured person, the one who is 
only passively negligent, on paying the damages, has a right 
of indemnity by which he shifts the entire burden of the 
loss to the party who is actively negligent. This is a right 
of implied indemnification which may arise from contract or 
6. 261 Cal. App.2d 539, 68 Cal. 
Rptr. 63 (1968). 
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from equitable considerations. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in 1958 gave full recognition to this right in City and 
County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing. 7 Ho Sing had made 
changes in the sidewalk adjoining his premises, and as a 
result someone was injured. The injured party recovered a 
$10,000 judgment against both the city and Ho Sing. The 
city paid half of the judgment and then sued for indemnity, 
thus placing full liability on Ho Sing. The court distinguishes 
indemnity from contribution (the latter also being allowed 
in this state since the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure, 
Section 875 in 1957) where plaintiff gets a joint judgment 
against both tortfeasors. Here there was a joint judgment, . 
but the city was entitled to full restitution rather than mere 
contribution. It is a difference between primary and sec-
ondary liability as well as active and passive conduct, between 
the character and kind of wrong. The ultimate conclusion 
as to whether the right exists in a particular case rests on 
facts to be decided by the trier of facts. 
Considerations pointing to a decision include the nature 
and scope of the relationship, the obligations owed by one to 
the other, the extent of the participation by the plaintiff seek-
ing indemnity in the affirmative acts of negligence, the physical 
connection of the plaintiff with the acts of the actor, the 
plaintiff's knowledge or acquiescence in what is done, and 
the failure of plaintiff to perform what he was called on to 
perform by their agreement. It is a question of fact. Herrero 
v. Atkinson.s If the active person is an independent con-
tractor, the right to indemnity should generally prevail.9 
In Muth v. Urricelqui/o the question was raised whether 
the owner's right to supervise the active contractor's work 
was enough participation to disentitle him to indemnity. The 
court held not, on the theory that the right to act did not raise 
a duty to act. Muth was both owner and the general con-
7. 51 Cal.2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 Co., 202 Cal. App.2d 99, 20 Cal. Rptr. 
(1958). 820 (1962). 
8. 227 Cal. App.2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 10. 251 Cal. App.2d 90 I, 60 Cal. 
490, 8 A.L.R.3d 629 (1964). Rptr. 166 (1967). 
9. Safeway Stores v. Mass Bonding 
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tractor who contracted with Urricelqui to do grading which 
was improperly done. The purchasers of the house recovered 
damages from the owner and general contractor, who sought 
indemnity from the actor. The reserved right to supervise 
was not participation, so recovery was allowed. But actual 
supervision might make a difference. 
In the recent case of Q'Melia v. California Production 
Service Inc.,ll defendant, an independent oil field repair con-
tractor, was employed by plaintiff to repair an oil well. Dur-
ing the work an employee of defendant was injured and 
obtained a settlement of $50,000 from the plaintiff, who sought 
indemnity. The injury was caused by the absence of certain 
safety latches in plaintiff's equipment. Plaintiff owned the 
machinery, which had no latches, and was on hand helping. 
He participated as he was connected physically with the opera-
tion. One instruction stated that plaintiff's right to indemnity 
would not be lost if he were inactive, unless he knew or should 
have foreseen, as a prudent person, that if the machinery 
were operated without the latches or some other safety device, 
someone might be hurt. Moreover, the court also instructed 
at defendant's request that because the work was done on 
plaintiff's property, it was a "place of employment" within 
the meaning of sections 6302 and 6304 of the Labor Code. 
He had the duty of providing a safe "place of employment" 
and of using safety devices, so he was not entitled to recover. 
A good recent case is Hoke v. lordan. 12 
Shifting by Finding that a Superseding Cause Came into 
Play 
This phase of shifting liability is prompted by some of the 
cases on shifting appearing in Prosser's Cases on Torts, fourth 
edition, pages 404 to 414. There is of course a change of 
liability when a true superseding cause is held to be the 
sole proximate cause of plaintiff's damages. It is a different 
shift from that noted in the indemnity cases. In the indemnity 
cases the liability of the indemnitee is founded on the rule 
11. 261 Cal. App.2d 618, 68 Cal. 12. 266 Cal. App.2d -, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 125 (1968). 631 (I968). 
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that the principal is entitled to indemnity from losses caused 
by the active negligence of his agent. In the causation cases, 
the liability of the original wrongdoer was real and primary, 
but it disappears when the new actor comes on the scene and 
neutralizes the causal effect of the first actor's conduct. The 
first actor is relieved of his liability even if his negligence is 
a substantial factor in bringing it about-Restatement sec-
tion 440. The new cause prevents the actor from being 
liable. Section 442 lists six considerations which are impor-
tant in making the determination whether a cause is super-
seding. (a) Does the intervention bring on damage of a 
different kind from what would result from the first actor's 
conduct? (b) Does what happens appear extraordinary 
rather than normal? (c) Is the intervening force a normal 
result of the original act? (d) Is it a positive act or just a 
failure to act? (e) Is the new force the result of a wrongful 
act of a third person? (f) What was the degree of cul-
pability of the wrongful act? 
The writer always recalls in this connection a case which 
arose in Lawrence, Kansas, in which a garageman was putting 
a set of new gas tanks under the ground. He had a moving 
contractor do the work and when the old tanks had been 
loaded on huge trucks to be carried away, the garage owner 
noticed that residual liquid in the old tanks was running 
down the street which sloped gradually. He worried about 
fire and called the fire chief to take care of the danger. The 
chief came with one of his men, and the chief said, "Let's see 
if the stuff will burn," and his man applied a match. Imme-
diately there was a fire six blocks long following the curb 
where several cars were parked. Several burned before their 
owners could be found. 13 Was the application of the match 
a superseding force? Were the garage owner and the con-
tractor still liable? The chief? The city? The car owners 
sued the garageman, Standard Oil Co., the contractor, and 
the fire chief. The court held the parties removing the tanks 
liable, saying, "the setting of the fire was not so unrelated to 
13. Trapp v. Standard Oil Co., 176 
Kan. 39, 269 P.2d 469 (1954). 
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the situation as to constitute the sole proximate cause". An-
other match throwing case is Stone v. Boston and Albany Rly. 
Co.14 in which the throwing of the match just negligently 
was held to be a superseding cause. Of course that was seventy 
years ago, but even then the great Chief Justice Knowlton 
dissented. 
Where does California stand on this? Gibson v. GarciaI5 is 
a starting place. A negligently driven car struck the defend-
ant's rotten utility pole, causing the pole to strike a user of 
the adjoining highway. The collision of the car with the pole 
was not a superseding cause. Certainly the Supreme Court 
of California has accepted the guidelines of sections 442 to 
453 of the Restatement to determine whether causes are super-
seding. I6 These cases rely on Restatement of Torts, section 
447, for the conclusion that the fact that an intervening act 
of a third person is done negligently does not make it an 
intervening cause if: (a) a reasonable man knowing the situa-
tion existing when the intervening act is done would not 
regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person so 
acted; or (b) that the act is a normal response to the situation 
created by defendant's negligent act and the manner in which 
the intervening act is done is not extraordinarily negligent. 
This statement is, of course, the language of section 447. 
Would the act of the fire chief who applied the match to gaso-
line be considered as superseding under this section? 
In Fuller v. Standard Stations Inc.,17 involving the sale of 
gasoline to an obviously inebriated driver, the court consid-
ered the conduct of the driver as an intervening cause. It 
simplified the question by simply saying that "the intervention 
of causal forces does not relieve earlier wrongdoers if those 
forces were foreseeable." This goes back to the brief formula 
of the late Professor Beale,xs who reduced the matter to 
14. J 7 J Mass. 536, 51 N .E. 1 (1898). 
15. 96 Cal. App.2d 681, 216 P.2d 
119 (1950). 
16. Stewart v. Cox. 55 Cal.2d 857, 
J 3 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345 (1961); 
McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 
Cal.2d 295, 195 P.2d 783 (1948); 
Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal.2d 
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continued liability if the injury was directly, or indirectly 
caused by (a) another force which was caused by the original 
force, or (b) by a new force which was foreseeable as likely 
to come into existence and unite with the situation created 
by the first force to cause the damage. 
The Mosely case,19 in which crates were negligently left 
on a sidewalk and moved by an unknown agent, to the injury 
of the plaintiff, presented the same problem. Liability was 
sustained, but the concurring opinion by Justice Traynor 
showing the relation of duty and causation is most valuable. 
He concluded that liability must be imposed because "the 
possibility that third persons would move the crates was not 
so remote that it could not be regarded as part of the risk. 
Defendant's negligence consisted in failing to protect plaintiff 
against that risk." Thus he handled the question as one of 
duty. ' 
The court having stated definitely that sections 442 to 
453 of the Restatement control the matter of determining what 
constitutes a superseding cause, it still remains to decide how 
a trial court should instruct the jury. The BAH instructions 
104C to 104C-D are based on California decisions which 
make the foreseeability of the intervening cause the issue for 
the jury.20 Thus we must ask how the Restatement sections, 
which now are deemed controlling, should be worked into 
the instructions. Should the actual provisions of the Restate-
ment be used? Trial courts are faced with a real problem. 
What if the jury returns to ask the court what the Restatement 
means? 
The trial court endeavored to clarify the issue in Ewart v. 
Southern California Gas Co. I by telling the jury that when 
it found an intervening cause it must then decide whether such 
19. Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 
Cal.2d 213, 157 P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R. 
872 (1945). 
20. Jones v. City of South San Fran-
cisco, 96 Cal. App.2d 427, 216 P.2d 25 
(1950) (Opinion by Justice Peters). 
Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal.2d 772, 285 
P.2d 269 (1955) (Opinion by Justice 
Traynor). That intermeddlers would 
start a bulldozer was foreseeable as 
an intervening force that would not 
supersede the original negligence. 
1. 237 Cal. App.2d 163, 46 Cal. Rptr. 
631 (1965). 
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plaintiff had shown that "defendants more probably than not 
could foresee the new cause." The court was here trying 
to implement the applicable sections of the Restatement. The 
district court held this was an erroneous interpretation for 
all that was required was that the defendant should have 
considered whether a reasonable man in defendant's position 
would regard it as highly extraordinary that a third person 
would have so acted. Thus would section 447 of the Restate-
ment find its way into the structure of our law. Ewart did 
not go up to the supreme court. We must await future cases. 
The Guest Statute 
The guest statute is unique in that it is designed to limit 
liability, whereas most statutes regulating conduct are designed 
to increase liability or at least facilitate its proof. Current 
judicial decisions also tend to increase liability as we indi-
cated in the first section of this study. Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that the guest statute's limitation on liability is 
strictly construed by the courts since it not only is in derogation 
of the common law, but also flies against the trend of the 
times. The statute limits the rule that a person must act 
with ordinary care, but the courts permit this limitation to 
operate only within the narrow confines of the statute. 
The California statute (Vehicle Code section 17158) pro-
vides that a guest who accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a 
highway without having given compensation for such ride 
cannot recover damages unless intoxication or willful mis-
conduct of the driver is established. A 1961 amendment to 
the Code further provides that the owner of an automobile 
is similarly barred if he is injured in his own vehicle while 
it is being driven by another. This amendment was designed 
to remove the uncertainty in the law which had developed 
when attempts were made to apply the statute to owners who 
were not driving when an accident occurred. It had seemed 
impossible to say that a person was a guest in his own car, 
yet it could be that in furnishing the car, he was giving 
compensation for his ride. The amendment, therefore, was 
designed to resolve these inconsistencies by giving the owner 
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the status of a guest if he was riding with someone in his 
car who was driving at the owner's request. 
Who Is a Guest? 
Whitehill v. Strickland2 is a case from the district court 
of appeal which involves the amendment to the statute men-
tioned above. A woman was traveling in her husband's auto-
mobile from the San Francisco bay area to Southern Cali-
fornia. The defendant, who was the husband's stepfather, 
accompanied her and was to share the driving chores. The 
defendant was driving when the car crossed over the center 
line and collided with another car. The woman, the owner's 
wife, was killed, and her husband, who was not present in 
the car, brought a wrongful death action. The defendant 
tried to hide behind the guest statute, but he did not succeed. 
He argued first, that as an owner, the plaintiff may not recover 
because the statute prohibits him from doing so. Second, 
he argued that the wife was a guest in the car when the 
accident occurred, and that since, as a guest, she would have 
been barred from recovery, her husband, in a wrongful death 
action, would also be barred. 
The statute, said the court, bars an owner from recovering 
only for his own injuries, and since he obviously was not 
injured, he was not barred in an action for his wife's wrongful 
death unless the wife's status in the car the moment she was 
killed was that of a guest. Was she, then, a guest? She 
certainly was not an owner, since the automobile was not 
community property. Was she her husband's guest? No, she 
was her husband's bailee, which made her the host, not the 
guest. But did the shifting of the stepfather to the driver's 
seat change the relationship? Not at all; the driver retained 
the guest status that he had always had. He had no rela-
tionship to the car; he did not own it; he did not rent it; 
he did not borrow it; and he did not have charge of it. 
Therefore, the defendant not the decedent was the guest. 
2. 256 Cal. App.2d 837, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
584 (1967), 
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The owner, therefore, could hold the defendant to a stand-
ard of ordinary care because the statute did not apply to these 
facts. The statute does not bar an owner from recovering 
for someone else's injuries, and the person who was injured 
was neither an owner nor a guest. It is interesting to consider 
how this case would have turned out if the car had been com-
munity property. The wife would then have been an owner, 
and she would have fallen within the limitation of the statute. 
If she could not have recovered for her injuries, had she 
lived, the question would have been whether the co-owner, 
the husband, would fare any better. The general rule seems 
to be that if the decedent is barred from recovery for injuries, 
if still alive, there can be no recovery on behalf of any benefi-
ciary in a wrongful death action.3 
Elisalda v. Welch's Sand & Graver is another example of 
strict construction. The district court was quick to find that 
the guest status, if it ever existed, had terminated.5 The 
parties were delivering cement from one site to another in a 
new subdivision. The plaintiff's foot was crushed by the 
wheel of the cement truck. The court held that if there ever 
had been a guest relationship, it had ended when the plaintiff's 
foot touched the ground as he got off the truck. Furthermore, 
the plaintiff had been sitting on the truck's fender, and since 
the statute says "in" a vehicle, not "on" a vehicle, the statute 
did not apply. And since the entire affair was in connection 
with a mutual business venture, it was easy for the court to 
find compensation; so the plaintiff was never a guest in the 
first place. 
Lubeck v. Lopes6 considers the statutory requirement of 
compensation. The defendant was driving the plaintiff to 
the defendant's attorney's office so that the plaintiff could 
obtain advice concerning her own personal affairs. An ac-
cident ensued, and the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff 
was barred from recovery by the statute unless she could show 
3. Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal.2d 5. Trigg v. Smith, 246 Cal. App.2d 
183,288 P.2d 12,289 P.2d 242 (1955). 510,54 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1966). 
4. 260 Cal. App.2d 46, 67 Cal. Rptr. 6. 254 Cal. App.2d 63, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
57 (1968). 36 (1967). 
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that she gave the defendant compensation for the ride. The 
plaintiff argued that the defendant received compensation, 
claiming that by providing the transportation to the attorney's 
office, the defendant was furthering her own business relation-
ship with the attorney. The court would not accept this 
reasoning. It is true that compensation need not be in cash, 
and that "such compensation may consist of any tangible 
benefit given to the driver, where such benefit is the motivating 
influence for supplying transportation to the rider. However, 
where an inference of tangible benefit conferred by the rider 
rests wholly in conjecture, such inference is insufficient to 
constitute compensation". 
What Conduct by the Guest Will Bar His Recovery? 
Contributory Negligence under the Guest Statute 
Is contributory negligence a defense to an action based on 
the guest statute where the defendant is guilty of willful 
misconduct? No, said the supreme court in Williams v. Carr,7 
although "contributory willful misconduct" is a defense. 
First, there is no support in the statute for the argument that 
contributory negligence should be a defense. Second, it is 
generally agreed that contributory negligence is not a defense 
to other non-statutory actions based on willful misconduct. 
Therefore, there is no basis for holding that contributory 
negligence should be a defense to any guest statute action. 
The problem, now, is to determine whether the plaintiff's 
conduct in Williams was ordinary contributory negligence or 
contributory willful misconduct. The answer is easy if the 
plaintiff exhibits a reckless disregard for his own safety, for 
such conduct is an assumption of risk, and such a plaintiff 
should not recover. In Williams, although the plaintiff and 
the defendant had been drinking together, willful misconduct 
was the issue, not intoxication. The defendant's misconduct 
consisted of continuing to drive the car in which he and the 
plaintiff were traveling after the defendant had realized that 
the beer he had consumed, plus the long hours he had spent 
7. 68 Cal.2d 579, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305, 
440 P.2d 505 (1968). 
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without sleep, had made him too drowsy to safely operate the 
vehicle. Since plaintiff was sound asleep at the time the 
defendant discovered his own sleepiness, there was no way 
plaintiff could have been aware of the defendant's misconduct. 
She was injured in the accident which ultimately occurred 
due to the defendant's driving while half-awake. Her con-
tributory negligence in getting in the car with him after 
both had had several beers was not enough; the issue was not 
intoxication. She must, in some way, either actively or 
passively, have assented to the misconduct. Since she had 
not assented, she was not barred from recovering. 
Collateral Source Payments and Their Effect on Damages 
In many cases involving serious injuries sustained from 
accidents caused by the faults of others, the victims often 
receive substantial sums from insurance companies, Medicare, 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, and from employers under work-
men's compensation. Should such payments be deducted from 
judgments recovered against persons at fault? Professor 
Fleming has written an exhaustive study of the problem.s 
The basic principle is that any sums received by plaintiff 
from parties at fault, other than the defendant, in causing the 
plaintiff's injuries are deductible from a judgment rendered 
against the defendant. This deduction insures that the plain-
tiff can only have one full satisfaction for his injuries. 
Presumably the judgment rendered is to cover all the injuries 
sustained. On the other hand, when the payments to plaintiff 
are made by parties who are not at fault, such amounts are not 
deductible. Frequently, an employer or his insurance carrier 
makes a payment by way of settlement. If the employer was 
not at fault, the amount paid is not deductible. This situation 
was clearly presented in the recent case of De Cruz v. Reid.9 
8. Fleming, The Collateral Source 
Rule and Loss A lIocation in Tort Law, 
54 Cal. L.Rev. 1178 (1966). See also 
City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Con-
struction Co., 66 Cal.2d 217, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 337, 424 P.2d 921 (1967). 
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9. 69 Cal.2d 217, 70 Cal. Rplr. 550, 
444 P.2d 342 (1968), following the 
supreme court decision in Witt v. Jack-
son, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 
366 P.2d 641 (1961). 
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De Cruz died in an accident while employed on a ranch. 
Defendant Reid was delivering fertilizer to the ranch in a large 
truck, and De Cruz was riding on the truck and assisting with· 
the unloading, when he was killed. The employer was not 
negligent. De Cruz's family settled with the employer for 
$18,000, under the workmen's compensation law, then 
brought suit against Reid, the negligent driver of the truck. 
A verdict was rendered for $40,000, and the sole question 
was whether the workmen's compensation settlement should 
be deducted from the amount of the verdict. The supreme 
court held that the $18,000 should not be deducted from the 
$40,000. If the employer himself had ac!ually been negligent, 
then workmen's compensation payments would be deductible 
from a judgment against the third person defendant under the 
principle that the wronged person is entitled to only one 
satisfaction. But since the employer was not negligent, this 
principle did not apply, and the workmen's compensation 
recovery was not deducted from the amount of the verdict in 
the negligence action. On the surface this seems to give the 
wronged person a greater recovery if he is wronged once than 
if he is wronged more than once. But that seems to be the 
law. 
Defamation 
The year we are reviewing yielded a number of defamation 
cases, and a complete survey of all of them on all issues would 
require the writing of a treatise on the subject. At the outset 
we have two cases10 setting at rest the question of how the 
undertaking called for by section 830 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure must be made. The section calls for two competent 
and sufficient sureties. The cases hold that either a cash 
deposit of $500 or the filing of a bond by a recognized surety 
company is a satisfactory compliance with the specific re-
quirements of section 830. Section 1056 of the Code of Civil 
10. Rogers v. County Bank of Santa 
Cruz 254 Cal. App.2d 224, 61 Cal. 
Rpt r. 879 (1967). Cash security deposit 
approved. Brandt v. Superior Court of 
Santa Clara County, 67 Cal.2d 437, 
62 Cal. Rptr. 429. 432 P.2d 31 (1967). 
The corporate bond complies with the 
statutory requirements. 
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Procedure gives full recognitIOn to the adequacy of such 
security. It is said that this security has the dual effect of 
(a) giving the defendant security for his costs and expenses, 
and (b) discouraging hastily filed defamation actions by 
impressing on litigants the need for mature consideration as 
to the propriety of going forward with process. 
In Washhurn v. Wright/ 1 an unincorporated association, 
which may sue in California, and another similar association 
were described in an advertisement, as "extremist organiza-
tions founded by John Birch Society members." The court 
referred to various definitions of the word "extremist" and 
concluded that in the mental climate of 1964 in California 
it was not defamatory per .'le to call anyone an extremist or a 
member of the John Birch Society. In such cases it is the 
function of the court to construe alleged defamatory language 
in a sense that is natural and obvious, and in a way in which 
the persons to whom it is communicated would be likely to 
understand it. Of course alleged membership in the Com-
munist party, or communist affiliation, or sympathy for Com-
munism is defamatory per .'le. So it is logical to conclude 
that alleged membership in the John Birch Society, which 
opposes Communism, will' not subject a person to hatred, 
contempt, and ridicule and cause him to be shunned or 
avoided. 
Stoneking v. Brigg.'l12 arose out of the troubles of a local 
labor union. Plaintiff had been president of the local, and 
some members reported to the international organization that 
things were going out of control; as a result the management 
of the local was put under the trusteeship of the parent organi-
zation. Defendant Briggs, a member of the local, reported to 
various newspapers that President Stoneking and Secretary 
Baum had been relieved of their positions. As a result of 
Briggs' statements, five articles appeared in bay area news-
papers concerning the trusteeship, the removal of Stoneking, 
and statements attributed to Briggs to the effect that Stoneking 
and Baum had been removed for internal reasons, that the 
11. 261 Cal. App.2d 7H9, 68 Cal. 12. 254 Cal. App.2d 563, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 224 (1968). Rptr. 249 (1967). 
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objective was to put the direction of the local in the hands of 
new leadership to bring order out of chaos, that there had 
been violations of federal and union laws, and that Stoneking 
had been under observation for some time. Briggs made 
similar statements to several reporters. 
The court instructed that the statements could have two 
meanings, one harmless, the other defamatory, and left it to 
the jury to make the finding. It also instructed that the jury 
could consider the insinuations that could be made from the 
words used, such as that officers Stoneking and Baum were the 
cause of the abuses, and that their elimination from office 
had been crucial to the solution of the difficulties. These 
matters were to be judged by the jury "by the natural and 
probable effect upon the mind of the average reader." The 
sting of the accusation was that Stoneking had failed to act 
for the best interests of the union and was grossly incompetent 
in his capacity as president. So the charge was clearly related 
to prohibitions under section 46(3) of the Civil Code. The 
code definitions of slander are very broad and have been 
held to include almost any language which on its face has a 
natural tendency to injure a person's reputation either gen-
erally or with respect to his occupation. What is said is 
construed from the expressions and from the whole scope 
and apparent object of the writer. See MacLeod v. Tribune 
Publishing CO. 13 
Some of the matters alleged in Stoneking were in fact true 
and admitted by the plaintiff. There were internal troubles 
in the local's affairs, and the trusteeship had followed the 
removal of the plaintiff from his position. But there were 
inaccuracies which could not be termed minor, and the in-
sinuations were the result of the inaccuracies. The jury could 
appraise the entire situation and conclude that average persons 
of ordinary intelligence would attribute defamatory insinua-
tions to defendant's statements, and that such insinuations 
were not true. And the record supports this conclusion. Thus 
13. 52 Cal.2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 
( \959). 
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we see that true statements may lead to liability because of the 
insinuations that follow therefrom. 
Defendant raised the issue of privilege. He recognized 
that the privilege is conditional on its use for proper purposes, 
and on the absence of malice. The defendant pointed out 
that since the jury did not assess any punitive damages, it 
did not find any malice. The court found the claim to be 
a nonsequitur. The fact that the jury did not award punitive 
damages does not necessarily negate the finding of malice. 
And there was no finding as a matter of law that there was 
no malice for if that had been the case, the evidence of the 
wealth of the parties would not have been admissible. It is 
not clear from the opinion whether the matter of excessive 
publication was presented to the jury. On that basis alone 
it would seem that the conditional privilege was lost. How 
could such publication to several newspapers be considered 
otherwise than excessive? Words said to members of the 
union would be clearly privileged. This is implied by the 
court when it points out that Briggs ought to have anticipated 
republication of statements made to inquiring reporters. And 
of course the greatest source of damage to plaintiff was this 
wide republication. Its only purpose could be to hurt the 
plaintiff. It was an abuse of a conditional privilege. Restate-
ment of Torts, sections 593 and 599. 
The subject of damages is well-reviewed. The jury allowed 
compensatory damages in the sum of $22,000, a substantial 
sum. A motion for a new trial was made on the basis that 
the amount allowed showed passion and prejudice. The trial 
court considered the matter very carefully and denied the 
motion, pointing out that: (a) there is no accurate standard 
in such cases; (b) the award was within the area of discretion; 
(c) no change should be made unless the allowance is grossly 
excessive and obviously due to passion and prejudice. The 
facts showed the life history of the plaintiff, his long-time 
membership of the local and his membership in a number of 
CIVIC organizations. He was shunned by friends of long 
standing, was the object of unfriendly remarks, and found 
it more difficult to obtain jobs in his trade as a carpenter. 
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We should note, too, that the supreme court denied a hearing 
in the case, but that Justice Traynor was in favor of granting 
the rehearing. 
In di Giorgio Corporation v. Valley Labor Citizen/4 an 
article written by defendant Jeff Boehm was published in the 
Union Gazette of the Olympic Press and circulated in Santa 
Clara County. A chap by the name of Galarza, an employee 
of labor organizations, had furnished materials to Boehm. 
Boehm's article falsely charged the plaintiff and a congressman 
with faking a congressional hearing report and using this 
report against union organization of farm workers. Thus, 
this was all prepared by a labor man on behalf of labor. 
When the article appeared in the Union Gazette, Galarza sent 
a copy to the defendant Valley Labor Citizen, and it was 
republished. Boehm had nothing to do with this republica-
tion, unlike the situation in the previous case in which Briggs 
made his statements to reporters and so obviously intended 
the republications for which he was held liable. Briggs not 
only foresaw republication, but intended and caused it. So 
in this case the question was whether a joint judgment against 
Boehm and the Valley Labor Citizen could stand. Of course 
anyone republishing a defamatory statement is liable for so 
doing even if he states the source of his information. But 
whether the originator should be liable for the republication 
is a different question. Of course, if the originator intends, 
or perhaps if he clearly foresees, the republication, he may be 
held liable.15 But here there was no claim that Boehm was 
in any way tied up with Valley. Galarza was the moving 
force all along, and Boehm was merely his tool. The court 
thus held that the joint judgment could not stand. Moreover, 
Boehm's newspaper was not asked to retract, so only special 
damages could be recovered against him. 
It must be noted that Valley was asked to retract, but it 
refused after consultation with Boehm and Union Gazette. 
This retraction had no effect on Boehm's liability as this must 
14. 260 Cal. App.2d 268, 67 Cal. 611, 213 P. 954 (1923); see also Curley 
Rptr. 82 (1968). v. Vick, 211 Cal. App.2d 670, 27 Cal. 
15. See Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1963). 
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be determined by what happened before the publication. The 
retraction only affects the damages. If it is refused, more 
damages are recoverable. If plaintiff pleads and proves a 
demand for a retraction which is refused, he may recover 
general and punitive damages in addition to special damages. 
To recover punitive damages, he must still prove actual malice. 
The court concludes that a writer in the position of Boehm 
could not be held for general and punitive damages unless 
his newspaper was given a chance to retract and then refused. 
Here the Union Gazette, for which Boehm worked, had not 
been asked to retract; hence Boehm could not be held to the 
verdict rendered. To do so would circumvent the retraction 
statute, Civil Code, section 48a. The court then held that 
the verdict for plaintiff against Valley could not be separated 
from that against Boehm, and therefore the whole case must 
be reversed. It was a single verdict, and there was no way 
for deciding the respective responsibilities. 
Envisaging a new trial against the Valley Labor Citizen, 
the court called attention to the possibility of a further limita-
tion on the liability of newspapers and radio stations by virtue 
of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, notably New York Times Co. v. Sullivan/6 denying 
liability unless plaintiff proves actual malice, evidenced by 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. ButtsI7 extended this concept to public 
figures so that there can be no recovery unless there is a show-
ing of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme 
departure from the standards of investigating and reporting 
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Valley 
Labor Citizen should be prepared to assert the constitutional 
privilege granted by these recent decisions. This is an affirma-
tive defense which must be pleaded and proved. IS One plain-
tiff is a congressman, making him a government figure, giving 
the defendant the special privilege granted under the First and 
16. 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 18. Pavlovsky v. Board of Trade, 171 
84 S.O. 7JO, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964). Cal. App.2d 110, 340 P.2d 63 (1959). 
17. 388 U.S. J30, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094, 
87 S.O. J 975 (1967). 
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Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
And so the Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and the United States decisions are introduced as "higher law" 
which will henceforth be of controlling force in California 
libel law when government officials and public figures are 
plaintiffs. 
Privilege 
The subject of privilege is a very common one in tort law. 
We find it in self-defense, defense of property, necessity and 
in all forms of self-help. Whenever we find it, we are con-
fronted with the making of a compromise. All privilege is 
based on compromise. We have to make a choice from two 
desirable ends. The less desirable end yields to the more 
desirable. We act like Brutus-not that he loved Caesar 
less, but that he loved Rome more.19 So when granting great 
privileges we must find the reason for granting them. The 
retraction laws of California in effect extend the privilege to 
publish without fear of large general damages, recovery being 
limited to special damages listed in the statute. 
It is well to note that the Constitution of California, Article 
I, section 9, on liberty of speech and of the press provides that 
"[ e ]very citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his senti-
ments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the 
liberty of speech or of the press." (Emphasis added.) The 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution tells us 
that Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of 
speech and of the press. And the Fourteenth Amendment is 
a similar limitation of the states' power to pass laws abridging 
the privileges of the citizens of the United States. These two 
amendments form the foundation of Justice Black's theory 
that the press should be free to publish even when motivated 
by malice. Should such extreme privileges be granted? We 
naturally look for the purpose of such an absolute right to 
injure citizens. Such an invasion of rights must be justified. 
19. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act 
III, scene 2. 
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What is the most desirable end? In New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,20 Justice Brennan refers to "our profound commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well 
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials." In Butts! the 
court stated that even as to public figures "our citizenry has a 
legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such 
persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited 
debate about their involvement in public issues and events is 
as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials.''' The people 
of any country, but especially of a democracy, must be 
thoroughly informed on all issues. Justices Black and Douglas 
insist that our forefathers saw this and accordingly placed in 
the Constitution these absolute privileges to criticize and com-
ment and even to publish false facts, known to be false. 
Our forefathers knew from experience how governments 
encroached on peoples' rights. Even in Shakespeare's day, 
there was no bill of rights. In fact a contemporary of his, 
Sir Edward Coke, was the leader in the movement to make 
kings observe the laws. He fought for the Petition of Rights 
in 1628, but the Petition itself did not get recognition until 
1689. About the same time, 1688, Pufendorf in Vienna was 
publishing his monumental work on natural law in which he 
states that to make a king subject to law is to deny his kingship. 
So the Bill of Rights was in effect a dike to prevent the overflow 
of autocratic power. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany, Poland, and the new edicts of Franco tell us about 
the great need of checking autocratic power today. The 
people must be informed. Justice Black is probably right. 
Our forefathers must have meant it when they said that "no 
laws should be passed." 
The writer has special interest in New York Times because 
the court relied on an opinion written by a great Kansas jurist 
in the year 1908.2 Justice Burch of Kansas was a most 
20. 376 U.S. 254, II L.Ed.2d. 686, 2. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 
84 S.Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964). 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). 
1. 388 U.S. 130, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094, 
87 S.Ct. 1975 (1967). 
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scholarly jurist. His opinion in Coleman is long and thorough. 
It is a treatise on libel. It was a case of misstatement of 
a fact by a newspaper about a candidate for state office. 
Justice Burch held that there was no cause of action unless 
actual malice was proved. Justice Brennan in New York 
Times quotes him at length. Professor Llewellyn in his last 
work, The Common Law Tradition, refers to Burch as one 
of the great jurists of the country. In the early thirties the 
American Law Institute was writing what are sections 598 and 
606 of the Restatement of Torts, and Justice Burch was a 
member of the committee working with the Reporter, who at 
that time was Professor Bohlen of Pennsylvania. Justice 
Burch suggested to this writer that he would appreciate any 
help possible in getting the Coleman case approved as the 
acceptable principle for the Restatement. This writer de-
murred for two reasons. First, he preferred the majority rule 
which is now section 598; and, second, it would have meant 
opposing the advocate of the accepted rule, the late Learned 
Hand, distinguished federal judge. It is sad that New York 
Times did not come about before Burch's death. It was 
Burch's position that the public official cases are governed 
by the fundamental principle that anyone with an interest to 
protect should be privileged to misstate facts honestly to an-
other person with the same interest. A church member can 
speak falsely about a member to another member as long as 
he is not motivated by malice. So a citizen should be likewise 
privileged to speak to another citizen about a third person 
who aspires to perform public functions. One quote from 
Burch-"In measuring the extent of a candidate's profert of 
character, it should always be remembered that the people 
have good authority for believing that grapes do not grow on 
thorns, nor figs on thistles." It is fun to ask a law class if 
that means anything. A logician can make observations. 
Burch's opinion was prophetic. The case should be returned 
to the casebooks. 
The applicability of the great privilege was again before the 
Supreme Court of the United States in St. Amant v. Thomp-
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son.3 St. Amant was a candidate for office in Louisiana, and 
in the course of a campaign speech he read a series of ques-
tions that he had put to a member of the Teamsters' Union 
and the answers given. The answers implicated Thompson, 
a deputy sheriff from Baton Rouge. Thompson immediately 
brought suit, claiming that the publication imputed "gross 
misconduct and inferred conduct of a most nefarious nature." 
Thompson recovered judgment for $5,000; the intermediate 
Louisiana court of appeal reversed because the record did not 
show that St. Amant had acted with actual malice, as required 
by New York Times. The highest court of Louisiana reversed 
again on the theory that there was an adequate showing of 
reckless activity to satisfy the New York Times rule. 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the privi-
lege prevented recovery as there was no adequate showing of 
malice; Justice Fortas wrote a vigorous dissent, as he did in 
Time, Inc. v. Hill,4 a case involving the right to privacy, 
insisting that there were still remnants of individual rights 
which were entitled to recognition. 
We are now ready to glance at the one California case 
involving these principles. Cepeda v. Cowles Magazine! was 
a suit brought by the well-known baseball star, formerly with 
the San Francisco Giants and the St. Louis Cardinals. 
He sued Cowles Publishing Co. for saying in its magazine, 
Look, that Cepeda was in "doghouse status" with his bosses, 
was not a team man and blamed everybody but himself when 
things went wrong. The federal trial judge in San Francisco 
had ruled for the defendant, entering summary judgment. 
Plaintiff appealed and the U. S. Court of Appeals reversed, 
stating that what Was written was not comment but factual 
statements which were actionable per se if not privileged. 
Hence no allegation or proof of special damages was necessary. 
This was not comment or criticism which would have been 
more easily privileged. The case was sent back for trial. 
3. 390 U.S. 727, 20 L.Ed.2d 262, 88 
S.Ct. 1323 (1968). 
4. 385 U.S. 374, 17 L.Ed.2d 456, 87 
S.Ct. 534 (1967). 
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The jury found for the defendant, and the case went up for 
a second appeal. 
Since the matter involved stating facts about Cepeda, the 
only question was whether there was a privilege to state false 
facts about a prominent baseball player. There was such a 
privilege under Butts, but recovery could be made if plaintiff 
could show actual malice. Cepeda was a public figure and 
Butts, in between the two trials, extended the same privilege to 
publication with respect to public figures as to public officials. 
So the Butts decision cast real hurdles for Cepeda to overcome. 
He was not able to establish that the defendant had acted with 
actual malice or that he had knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard for whether the statement was true or false. In 
Butts a slightly less rigid showing needed to be made than in 
New Yark Times, for it was sufficient for the plaintiff to win 
if he showed that the defendant had been guilty of "highly 
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from 
standards of investigating and reporting ordinarily adhered 
to by responsible publishers." At any rate when the case 
came up for trial, Butts had been decided so the "higher law" 
had come into the picture. 
Because Butts had just been decided, in the second trial 
Cepeda now had to show facts meeting the Butts standards 
recited above. The jury found for the defendant and on 
appeal to the circuit court, the judgment was affirmed. Judge 
Madden, who wrote the opinion, gave a concise and thorough 
resume of the situation. He noted how Justice Frankfurter 
had indicated only 12 years before that the federal amend-
ments had no bearing on libel cases, but that now, under the 
cases reviewed, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove actual 
malice or extreme departure from standards of investigation 
and reporting on the part of the defendant, and that the 
evidence supported the jury's finding that plaintiff had failed 
to establish his case. His summary as to how the Supreme 
Court divided on the issue is concise. The Chief Justice would 
use only the test given in Times v. Sullivan; Justices Black and 
Douglas would make the privilege absolute. Madden refers 
to the Butts test as relatively liberal in the direction of recovery. 
He points out that the instruction based on Justice Harlan's 
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language in Butts should not have been given since Harlan's 
proposed test had been rejected by the majority of the Supreme 
Court. So we now have new privileges for the press. 
In Hayward v. Watsonville Register-Pajaronian and Sun,6 
we have an illustration of the privilege of a newspaper to make 
"a fair and true report in a public journal" of a judicial 
proceeding. This is the language of part of section 47 of the 
Civil Code, which lists the publications that are privileged. 
Here the newspaper published a report on Hayward based 
on police and FBI reports, revealing that: (1) Hayward was 
arrested on a warrant, issued by the police department, charg-
ing grand theft of $3300 worth of furniture; (2) police found 
$3300 worth of furniture that had not been charged to him; 
( 3) the store of which Hayward was manager had moved to 
repossess some furniture which he had charged; and (4) 
police records show that Hayward previously served a term 
in a Kansas prison on a check charge. Hayward brought 
suit for libel, alleging that not one of these statements was 
true. 
There are two questions involved. First, was this a 
report of a judicial proceeding and, second, was it a "fair 
and true" report? The courts take a broad view of the 
meaning of "judicial proceeding.»7 In Hayward, the court 
cites cases where the oral statements of district attorneys, 
sheriffs, and police officers were held to be qualifiedly privi-
leged under Civil Code, section 47; therefore crime reports of 
a police department and FBI identification records should also 
be privileged under the code. 
The FBI report showed: 
Name Arrested 
and Number or Received Charge 
Leslie Hayward 7-5-39 Forgery 
Disposition 
1 to 10 years 
in the K.S.I.R. 
paroled. 
6. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. Cal. App.2d 224, 40 P.2d 520 (1935). 
295 (1968). "A defendant need not justify every 
7. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal.2d word of the alleged defamatory matter; 
375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956); Kurata v. it is sufficient if the substance, the gist, 
Los Angeles News Publishing Co., 4 and sting of the charge is justified." 
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Actually the facts were: Hayward pleaded guilty to a charge 
of forgery in the second degree; he was sentenced to a term 
of not less than ten years at hard labor in the Kansas State 
Industrial Reformatory; he was placed in the custody of the 
sheriff of Rice County until he could be taken to the reform-
atory; and later that same day he applied for a parole or proba-
tion which was granted to take effect on July 24. There was 
no showing that he spent any part of the eleven-day period 
following the trial in the Kansas State Industrial Reformatory. 
The court found that what the defendant said about the 
plaintiff based on this FBI record was a "fair and true report 
of a judicial proceeding" within the meaning of Civil Code 
section 47. 
It should be noted that for each item, the defendant in-
dicated the source of the information. This is very important. 
The court emphasized such words as "police said" and "police 
records show." Instead of the word "forgery" the defendant 
used the words "check charge." This is a distinction without 
a difference. But certainly it is important to indicate the 
source in each case. 
Additional phases of tort law that might have been examined 
would include contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk, fraud, right to privacy, conversion, and false imprison-
ment. Some of these have been touched upon in connection 
with problems to which they were related. They can be given 
more emphasis in future articles. 
* 
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